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ABSTRACT
This paper, written for the NBER Conferenceon the Changing Role of the
United States in the World Economy, covers
the capital account in the U.S.
balance of payments. It first tracesthe history from 1946 to 1980, a period
throughout which Americans were steadilybuilding up a positive net foreign
investment position. it subsequently
describes the historic swing of the
capital account in the 1980s towardmassive borrowing from abroad. There are
various factors, in addition to expectedrates of return, that encourage or
discourage international capitalflows: transactions costs, government
controls, taxes, default and other politicalrisk and exchange risk. But the
paper argues that theincrease in real interest rates andother expected rates
of return in the United States, relativeto other countries, in the earlyl980s
was the major factor that beganto attract large net capital inflows.It
concludes that a large increase in the U.S.federal budget deficit, which was
not offset by increased private saving, was
the major factor behind the increase
in real interest rates, and thereforebehind the switch to borrowing from
abroad.
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I.Introduction
When consumer electronics roll off theassembly line in East Asia,
when there is a bumper wheat crop in Argentina,Otwhenshoe production
expandsin Italy, the relevance to u.s. producersand consumers is tan-
gible. The large U.S. tradedeficit has become a source of concern fami—
liar to Americans. When Japan liberalizesportfolio guidelines for life
insurance companies, when there is acollapse of investment opportunities
in Latin America, or when fixed brokeragecommissions are abolished in the
Uty of Thndon, the relevancefor Americans is much less tangible.Bit the
international flow of capital is no less importantthan the flow of goods.
Indeed, there is an important sense inwhich capital flows have been the
cause of the U.S. trade deficit inthe l9BOs, with U.S. government macro-
economic policies the driving force behindit all.
International capital movements affect theU .5. economy in a number of
ways. nks, securities companies,
and other providers of financial ser-
vices, constitute the sector of theAmerican economy that is most directly
affected. They now compete with financialinstitutions in lbkyo, thndon,
Frankfurt, and around the world. Exportsof financial and other services
are a growing credit item in theu.s. balance of payments, and thecurrent
u.s. Administrationhas placed a high priority onmore favorable treatment
of U.S. financial institutions inbilateral trade negotiations, and on
liberalization of trade in services generallyin the "Uruguay Round" of
negotiations under CAn (General Agreementon 1riff a and Wade).—2—
The impact of international
capital flows reaches far beyonda Single
sector of the hnerican
economy, however. Every U.S. firm feelsthe effect,
which conies through two mainchannels. First is theavailability of
capital, as reflected in interest
rates. Large corporationsare increas-
ingly often borrowing fromforeign residents, and portfoliomanagers are
increasingly investing abroad. iteventhe many firms who borrowonly at
home, or the many individuals whohold only domesticassets, are affected,
because U.S. interest rates
are increasingly determined on worldcapital
markets jointly with othercountries' interest rates. Thesecond channel
through which U.S. producersare affected is the exchangerate, which by
the l980s has become
overwhelmingly determined by flows ofcapital rather
than flows of goods.Again, even those firms that don'texport are
affected, to the extent they
compete with imports or buy importedinputs.
This paper is organized in fivesections. Section II reviewsbriefly
the postwar history of theU.S. capital accountup to the l970s, a period
throughout which Americans were
steadily building up a positive netforeign
investment position. Section III
considers those factors, other than
expected rates of return, that
discourage or encourage internationalcapi-
tal flow: transactions
costs, government controls, taxes, defaultand
other political risk, andexchange risk. The record isgenerally one of
gradually diminishing barriers. SectionIV describes the historicswing of
the U.S. capital account inthe 1980s toward massiveborrowing from abroad.
Section V examines international
differences in rates of returnon various
assets, and shows how the increase in
interest rates in the UnitedStates
in the early l980s attractedthe large net capital inf lows.Section VI
concludes the paper with ananalysis of U.S. government
Policies_—monetary,—3—
tax andspending—in determining U.S. saving, investment,andthe net
capital inflow. The lesson that emergesinthe end is that the primary
source of the large U.S. borrowingfrom abroad, and theref ore of its
counterpart the large U.S. trade deficit,is the federal budget deficit.
II •NetU.S. (hpitsl (kitflows in the Period 1946—1980
Table1 presents the figures for the U.S. balanceof payments from
1946 to 1985. The first half of the tablebreaks down the current account
into its components: merchandise trade,investment income, travel and
transportation, other services, etc. Thesecond half of the table shows
the components of the reverse side of thebalance of payments coin, the
capital account. Until the last few yearsof this period, private capital
was on net steadily flowing out ofthe country. Sit the story nevertheless
features a number of twists and turns overthe years.
1•Theperiodof dollar shortagC
In the immediate aftermath of World War II,the United States ran
large trade surpluses, as measuredeither by the merchandise balance (goods
alone) or the balance on goods and services.These surpluses were the
counterpart to large trade deficits in &xropeand elsewhere in the world.
The war—ravaged countries had lost much oftheir industrial and
agricultural capacity, and needed to importbasic necessities of consump-
tion, as well as capital goods to rebuildtheir economies. They had a
shortage of dollars with which to buysuch goods. The flow of goods from
the United States to Europe was financed partly byforeign aid and other
transfers, partly by lending, and partly by anincrease in U.S. officialTable 1.(L-1)
International Statistics
U.S. international transactIons,1946-85
[millions of dollars, dataseasonally adjusted,
except as noted. Credits (+),debits(-)j
Year or n—?4erchandjse'2
I I Investment income3—1
quarter ExportsImports Net ReceiptsPayments Net
1946 11,764 —5,067 6,697 772 —212 20,565
1947 16,097 —5,973 10,124 1,102 —245 857
1948 13,265 —7,557 5,708 1,921 —437 1,484
1949 12,213 —6,874 5,339 1,831 —476 1,355
1950 10,203 —9,051 1,122 2,068 —559 1,509
1951 14,243 —11,176 3,067 2,633 —583 2,050
1952 13,449 —10,838 2,611 2,751 —555 2,196
1953 12,412 —10,975 1,437 2,736 —624 2,112
1954 12,929 —10,353 2,576 2,929 —582 2,347
1Excludes military-
2Adjustedfrom Census data for differences invaluation, coverage, and
timing.
3Fees and royalties fromU.S. dirâct invesments abroador from foreign
direct investments in the United Statesare excluded from investment income
and included in other services net.Table 1.(L—2)
International Statistics
u.s. international transactions, 1946—85
(millions of dollars, data seasonallyadjusted!
except as noted. Credits (+), debits (—)]
Yearor n—Merchandise12 I I Investmentincome3— I
quarter ExportsImports Net ReceiptsPayments Net
1955 14,424 —11,527 2,897 3,406 -676 2,730
1956 17,556 —12,803 4,753 3,837 —735 3,102
1957 19,562 —13,291 6,271 4,180 —796 3,384
1958 16,414 —12,952 3,462 3,790 —825 2,965
1959 16,458 —15,310 1,148 4,132 —1,061 3,071
1960 19,650 —14,758 4,892 4,616 —1,237 3,379
1961 20,108 —14,537 5,571 4,999 —1,245 3,754
1962 20,781 —16,620 4,521 5,618 —1,324 4,294
1963 22,272 —17,048 5,224 6,157 —1,561 4,596
1964 25,501 —18,700 6,801 6,824 —1,784 5,040
1965 26,461 —21,510 4,951 7,437 —2,088 5,349
1966 29,310 —25,493 3,817 7,528 —2,481 5,047
1967 30,666 —26,866 3,800 8,020 —2,747 5,273
1968 33,626 —32,991 635 9,368 —3,378 5,990
1969 36,414 —35,807 607 10,912 —4,869 6,043Table 1.(L-3)
International Statistics
U.S. International transactions, 1946—85
[millions of dollars, data seasonallyadjusted,
except as noted. Credits (+),debits(—)j
Yearor Merchandise12
F I Investment income3
quarter ExportsImports Net ReceiptsPayments Net
1970 42,469 —39,866 2,603 11,747 —5,516 6,231
1971 43,319 —45,579 —2,260 12,707 —5,436 7,271
1972 49,381 —55,797 —6,416 14,764 —6,572 8,192
1973 71,410 —70,499 911 21,808 —9,65512,153
1974 98,306—103,811 —5,505 27,587 —12,084 15,503
1975 107,088 —99,185 8,903 25,351 —12,56412,787
1976 114,745—124,228 —9,483 29,286 —13,31115,975
1977 120,816—151,907 —31,091 32,179 —14,21717,962
1978 142,054—176,001 —33,947 42,245 —21,680 20,565
1979 184,473—212,009 —27,536 64,132 —32,960 31,172
1980 224,269—249,749 —25,480 72,506 —42,120 30,386
1981 237,085—265,063 —27,978 86,411 —52,329 34,082
1982 211,196—247,642 —36,444 85,549 —54,88328,666
1983 201,820—268,900 —67,080 77,251 —52,410 24,841
1984 219,900—322,422—112,522 86,221 —67,469 18,752
1985 214,424—338,863—124,439 89,991 —64,80325,188
tTable 1.(L-4)
International Statistics
u.s. international transactions, 1946-85
(millions of dollars, data seasonally adjusted,
except as noted.]
U.S. assets abroad, net Foreign assets in the U.S. net
increase/capital outflow(—)] (increase/capital outflow(-) 3
Other
Year or U.S. U.S. u.s. Foreign Other
quarter Total official Govern-private Total official foreign














6Consists of gold, special drawing rights, convertible currencies,and the
U.S. reserve position in the International MonetaryFund (IMF).Table 1.(L-4)
International Statistics
U.S. international transactions, 1946-85
[millions of dollars, data seasonally adjusted,
except as noted.)
U.S. assets abroad, net Foreign assets in the U.S. net
[increase/capital outflow(-)] [increase/capital outflow(-))
Other
Year or u.s. U.S. U.S. Foreign Other
quarter Total official Govern-private Total official foreign




1960 —4,0992,145 —1,100 —5,144 2,294 1,473 821
1961 —5,538 607 —910 —5,235 2,705 765 1,939
1962 —4,1741,535 —1,085 —4,623 1,911 1,270 641
1963 —7,270 378 —1,662 —5,986 3,217 1,986 1,231
1964 —9,560 171 —1,680 —8,050 3,643 1,660 1,983
1965 —5,7161,225 —1,605 —5,336 742 134 607
1966 —7,321 570 —1,543 —6,347 3,661 —672 4,333
1967 —9,757 53 —2,423 —7,386 7,379 3,451 3,928
1968 —10,977 —870 —2,274 —7,833 9,928 —774 10,703
1969 —11,585 —1,179 —2,200 —8,206 12,702 —1,301 14,002
1970 —9,337 2,481 —1,589 —10,229 6,359 6,908 —550
1971 —12,475 2,349 —1,884 —12,940 22,970 26,679 —3,909Table 1.(L-4)
International statistics
u.s. international transactions, 1946-85
[millions of dollars, dataseasonally adjusted,
except as noted.]
u.s. assets abroad, net Foreign assets in the U.S. net
[increase/capital outflow(-)] [increase/capital outflow(-)]
Other
Year or U.S. U.S. U.S. Foreign Other
quarter Total official Govern—private Total official foreign
reserve ment- assets assets assets
assets6assets
1972 —14,497 —4 —1,568 —12,92521,46110,475 10,986
1973 —22,874 158 —2,644 —20,38818,388 6,026 12,362
1974 —34,745—1,467 366 —33,64334,24110,546 23,696
1975 —39,703 —849 —3,474 —35,38015,670 7,027 8,643
1976 —51,269—2,558 —4,214 —44,498 36,51817,693 18,826
1977 —34,785 —375 —3,693 —30,717 51,319 36,816 14,503
1978 —61,130 732 —4,660 —57,20264,036 33,678 30,358
1979 —64,331—1,133 —3,746 —59,45338,752 —13,665 52,416
1980 —86,118—8,155 —5,162 —72,80258,11215,497 42,615
1981 —111,031—5,175 —5,097 —100,75883,322 4,960 78,362
1982 —121,273—4,965 —6,131 —110,17794,078 3,593 90,486
1983 —50,022—1,196 —5,005 —43,82185,496 5,968 79,527
1984 —23,639 —3,131 —5,523 —14,986 102,767 3,037 99,730
1985 —32,436—3,858 —2,824 —25,754 127,106—1,324 128,430
5includes extraordinary U.S. GovernnIent transactionswith India.Table 14R—1)
International Statistics
U.S. international transactions,1946—85
[millions of dollars, dataseasonally adjusted,
except as noted. Credits (+), debits(-)j
Net Remit-
Net travel Other Balance tances
Year ormilitary and serv- on goods pensions, current
quartertransac-transpor- ices and and other account14
actions tation net3 servicesl4unilateral
transfersl
1946 —493 733 310 7,807 —2,922 4,885
1947 —455 946 145 11,617 —2,625 8,992
1948 —799 374 175 6,942 —4,525 2.417
1949 —621 230 208 6,511 —5,638 873
1950 —576 —120 242 2,177 —4,017 —1,840
1951 —1,270 298 254 4,399 —3,515 884
i-Excludes military.
3Fees and royalties fromU.S. direct invesments abroador from foreign
direct investments in the UnitedStates are excluded from investmentincome
and included in other servicesnet.
41n concept, balanceon goods and services is equal to netexports and
imports in the national income andproduct acdunts (and the sum of balance
on current account and allocations of
special drawing rights is equal to net
foreign investment in the accounts),although the series differ because of




(millions of dollars, dataseasonally adjusted,
except as noted. Credits (+),debits (—))
Net Remit-
Net travel Other Balance tances
year ormilitary and serv- on goods pensions, current
quartertransac-transpor- ices and and other account14
actions tation net3 services14unilateral
transfers1
1952 —2,054 83 309 3,145 —2,531 614
1953 —2,423 —238 307 1,195 —2,481 —1,286
1954 —2,460 —269 305 2,499 —2,260 219
1955 —2,701 —297 299 2,928 —2,498 430
1956 —2,788 —361 447 5,153 —2,423 2,730
1957 —2,841 —189 482 7,107 —2,345 4,762
1958 —3,135 —633 486 3,145 —2,361 784
1959 —2,805 —821 573 1,166 —2,448 —1,282
1960 —2,752 —964 579 5,132 —2,308 2,824
1961 —2,596 —978 594 6,346 —2,524 3,822
1962 —2,449 —1,152 809 6,025 —2,638 3,387
1963 —2,304 —1,309 960 7,167 —2,754 4,4414
1964 —2,133 —1,146 1,041 9,604 —2,761 6,823
1965 —2,122 —1,280 1,367 8,285 —2,854 5,432
1966 —2,935 —1,331 1,365 5,963 —2,932 3,031
1967 —3,226 —1,750 1,612 5,708 —3,125 2,583Table 1.(R-2)
International Statistics
U.S. international transactions,1946—85
[millions of dollars, dataseasonally adjusted,
except as noted. Credits (+), debits(—j
Net Remit-
Net travel Other Balance tances
Year or military and serv— on goods pensions, current
qpartertransac—transpor—ices and and other account14
actions tation net3 services14unilateral
transfers1
1968 —3,143 —1,548 1,630 3,563 —2,952 611
1969 —3,328 —1,763 1,833 3,393
- —2,994 399
1970 —3,354 —2,038 2,180 5,625 —3,294 2.331
1971 —2,893 —2,345 2,495 2,269 —3,701 —1,433
1912 —3,420 —3,063 2,766 —1,941 —3,854 —5,795
1973 —2,070 —3,158 3184 11,021 —3,881 7,140
1974 —1,653 —3,184 3,986 9,147 —7,186 1,962
1975 —746 —2,182 4,598 22,729 —4,613 18,ll&
1976 559 —2,558 4,711 9,205 —4,998 4,207
1977 1,528 —3,565 5,272 —9,894 —4,167 —14,511
1978 621 —3,5i 6,013 —10,321 —5,106 —15,427
1979 —1,778 —2,995 6,214 5,138 —6,128 —991
5lncludes extraordinaryu.s. Government transactions withIndia.Table 1.(R-3)
International statistics
u.s. international transactions, 1946-85
[millions of dollars, data seasonally adjusted,
except as noted. Credits (+),debits(—)]
Net Remit-
Net travel other Balance tances
year ormilitary and serv- on goods pensions, current
quartertransac-transpor- ices and and other account14
actions tation net3 services14unilateral
transfers1
1980 —2,237 —997 7,793 9,466 —7,593 1,873
1981 -1,183 144 8,699 13,764 —7,425 6,339
1982 —274 —992 8,829 —214 —8,917 —9,131
1983 —369 —4,227 9,711 —37,123 —9,481 —46,604
1984 —1,827 —8,593 9,881 —94,308 —12,157 —106,466
1985 —2,917 —11,128 10,603 —102,694 —14,983 —117,677Table 1.(R-4)
International Statistics
U.S. international transactions, 1946—85
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1950 —1,019 —3,618Table 1.(R-4)
International Statistics
U.S. international transactions, 1946-85
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1970 867 —219 —10,258
1971 717 —9.779 —29,945
1972 710 —1,879 —11,181
1973 —2,654 —6,184
1974 —1,458 —9,077
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holdings of international reserves •Thislast means that the United States
was running a surplus in its overall balanceof payments: the surplus in
the current account—defined as goods, services, andtransfers—was greater
than the net private capital outflows.
In the 1950s, as the European and other economies recovered,their
trade balances improved and, as a natural consequence, the U.S.trade
surplus returned to more normal levels. By theend of the decade, the
surplus in goods and services had fallen belowthe deficit in transfers and
private capital flows, so that the United States was runningsubstantial
overall balance of payments deficits.
2.The balance ofpayments problem inthe l960s
One could view the emerging U.S. deficit of this period,and the rest
of the world's surplus, as the natural outcome of steadyworldwide growth
under the "dollar standard." Although the 1944 conference atBretton
Woods, New Hampshire, that established the postwarinternational monetary
system did not give the U.S. dollar thisrole officially, the dollar soon
became the de facto reserve currency of the system, becauseit was conver-
tible into gold and because of the economic wealth and political prestige
of the United States. As world trade grew, countriesneeded to hold
growing levels of reserves, and running balanceof payments surpluses was
the only way other countries had of acquiring dollar reserves.This is the
sense in which the U.S. balance of paymentsdeficits could be viewed as a
natural consequence of worldwide economic growth underthe monetary system.
Nevertheless, the increasing ratio of dollars heldabroad to gold held by
the U .5 •Governmentbeganto cause concern •Itseemed that the system—5—
could only become more and more vulnerableover time to a crisis in which
the holders of dollars around the worldwould try to cash in their claims
for gold and the United States would beunable to pay.
In the early l960s, the balance ofpayments deficit was entirely a
deficit of the capital account. The
merchandise trade balance, goods and
services balance, and current accountwere all in substantial surplus.
But, beginning under the Kennedy Administration,capital outflows became
the subject of increasing concern. Under"Operation ltdst," monetary
policy sought to raise short—terra interest ratesto attract short—term
capital from abroad, at the same time as long—terminterest rates were kept
low with the aim of stimulating investment. Aseries of increasingly
strong direct controls on the outflow of capital were alsoput into place,
though they were not very effective: the rise of theEuromarket, outside
the grasp of U.S. regulators, dates from thisperiod.
Much of the capital outflow took the form ofU.S. direct invesment in
Europe and elsewhere. Outward direct investment increasedfrom $2.9
billion in 1960 to $10.2 billion in 1970,explaining most of the increase
in measured private capital outf low.1 One viewwas that the United States
was playing a useful role as the world's banker:borrowing short—term and
lending long—term. A bank does it by taking deposits andlending to
businesses and homeowners; the world's banker woulddo it by creating
liquid dollar reserves for others to hold andinvesting in plant and
equipment abroad. Bit some, the French inparticular, resented the idea
that Americans were buying out their factoriesand land, offering in return
only paper that was less and less adequately backedby gold.—6—
3•Thebreakup of the ketton Woods syst
In the late l960s, the U.S •balanceof payments problem became more of
atrade balance problem. The reason was expansionary macroeconomic poli-
cies. After 1965, military spending increased rapidly because of the
escalation of the Viet Nam War. At the same time, domestic spending was
increasing under Lyndon Johnson's Great Society program. Furthermore,
monetary policy accommodated the expansion, with the exception of a couple
of brief attempts at braking. Rapid growth in income resulted directly in
rapid growth in imports. The economy also became overheated, giving rise
to inflation. U.S. inflation, in a system under which the dollar was sup-
posedly not allowed to devalue, resulted in a gradual loss of competitive-
ness by American firms on world markets. In 1971, the U.S. trade balance
went into deficit for the first time in the postwar period. In response to
the trade deficit and to a corresponding loss in reserves, Richard Nixon
unilaterally devalued the dollar in terms of both gold and foreign curren-
cies, placeda tariff surcharge on imports, and ended the U .S. Government's
commitment to sell gold for dollars to foreign central banks •Thismarked
theend of the Bretton Woods system. Most foreign central banks continued
to cooperate in the effort to prop up the system of fixed exchange rates,
buying up unwanted dollars. Sit by now, private speculators knew that
selling dollars was a good bet. As a result, capital outflows were very
high throughout the early 1970s. In the accounts in Table 1, they show up
as an increase in the rate at which U.S. residents acquired claims abroad
(and in the statistical discrepancy) .Inthe first few months of 1973,
several of the major central banks had to absorb unprecedented quantities
of dollars, with no end in sight. In March 1973, they ceased their—7—
commitments to buy and sell dollars at fixed exchange rates. In other
words, the world moved from the fixed exchange rate system to the current
system of floating exchange rates.
With the exchange rate now free to move, the desire of investors to
allocate a higher proportion of their portfolios to foreign assets suddenly
took the form of an increase in the price of foreign assets in terms of
dollars, that is, a depreciation of the dollar. The depreciation meant
that American manufacturers and farmers could once again compete in world
markets on favorable terms. The current account returned to surplus in the
years 1973—76.
4.Capital outflow in the mid—l9lOs
The rate of net private capital outflow reached a stable plateau in
the mid—1970s. This outflow was not primarily a sign of lack of confidence
in the U.S. economy, as it had been in 1970—73. Indeed, there were times,
for example in the immediate aftermath of the late—l973 oil crisis, when
investors increased their demand for dollar assets Rather, the United
States was behaving as a mature industrialized country generally is
expected to behave: running a current account surplus ($18.1 billion in
1975) and investing the proceeds in other countries where they can earn a
higher rate of return.
The financial situation began to deteriorate, however, in the latter
half of the decade. Following the oil crisis and the 1975 world recession,
there was concern, particularly in the United States and in developing
countries, that worldwide saving was too high and expenditure too low to
sustain growth. There had been a massive transfer of wealth to the members—8—
of OPEC, many of whom had a high tendency to save the wealth rather than
spend it. The United States undertook steady fiscal and monetary expan-
sion, with the Europeans following only reluctantly and with a delay. The
result was rapid growth in U.S. imports and a fall in the trade balance; in
1977 and 1978, the current account registered substantial $15 billion
deficits. The Carter Administration could have argued that the trade
deficits were not cause for concern, but to the contrary, were precisely
what was needed: The expansion in demand was sustaining recovery in the
United States, and at the same time was allowing those developing countries
that were faced with sharply increased oil import bills to earn the foreign
exchange to pay them by exporting to the United States, kit the record
deficits did generate concern. In 1977—78, as it was to again in 1985—86,
the U.S. Treasury pressured foreign governments to expand their own
economiesin order to increase purchases from the United States. In both
episodes, reluctant foreign governments had to face the alternative that
the sane goal, reducing the U.S. trade deficit, would instead be accom-
plished by an accelerated depreciation of the dollar.
We will discuss in later sections the declines in real interest rates
and in the value of the dollar during this period. Here we note that the
swing from surplus to deficit on the -currentaccount in 1977—78 was not
associated with an offsetting swing from deficitto surplus on the private
capital account •Privatecapital on net continued to flow out at a steady
rate of about $20 billion a year.3 The U.S. current account deficit was
financed by increased holdings of U.S. assets on the part of foreign
central banks ("official foreign assets" in Table 1), rather than on the
part of foreign private citizens. Much as at the beginning of the decade,'-9—
foreign central banks were buying dollars in an unsuccessful attempt to
prevent the dollar from depreciating and their owncurrenciesfrom
appreciating.
The depreciation of the dollar stimulated exports enough to return the
country to a surplus in goods and services in 1979 and 1980. At the same
time, the nature of capital flows began to change. This was the end of a
long period of steady U.S. net investment abroad.4 In the l980s, capital
on net began to flow in to finance U.S. trade deficits, reversing the
pattern of the preceding 35 years •Wewill be picking up the story of the
capital inflows in Section IV.
III. Rtsk, Government(bntrols,and Other Ibrriers or
Incentivesto International (Spital )bvements
Manyfactors influence investors' decisions to move capital Inter-
nationally. The most obvious factor is the expected rate of return that
can be earned in one country or another. In Section V, we will be looking
at various measures of rates of return in the United states and other major
countries, with special reference to the increased attractiveness of U.S.
assets in the early 1980s. &it other factors are important as well.
Indeed, if investors cared only about expected returns and nothing else,
then one would not observe any differentials in rates of return. Investors
would refuse to buy the assets with the lower return and would have an
unlimited demand for the assets with the higher return. In other words,
arbitrage would quickly insure that expected returns were equalized We
will see in Section V below that this does not quite seem to be the case.
In this section we consider factors other than expected rates of return:transactions costs, capital controls, taxes, default risk, and exchange
risk.
1.fransactions costs
An unavoidable barrier to international capital movements is transac-
tions costs, as represented in the case of securities by a brokerage fee or
a bid—ask spread. Bit this barrier is extremely small for countries with
developed financial markets •Severalfactors have worked to reduce trans-
actions costs steadily over the years. Deregulation, innovation, and
economies of scale in international dealings, particularly in the Euromar—
ket, have made the world banking and securities industry more efficient.
Some of the many recent innovations in international markets to make the
issuance of securities, or the management of the accompanying risk, more
convenient for borrowers or lenders include: currency and interest rate
swaps, dual currency issues, mismatched floating rate notes, zero coupon
bonds, equity—related issues, note issuance facilities, and Eurocommercial
paper.6 Reduced telecommunications costs and other technological advances
have also been important. The real cost of sending a telegraphic message
from New York to lnndon or Paris in 1985 was only 8—9 percent of what it
was in 1900, and the real cost of a three—minute off—peak phone call
between Washington and Frankfurt was only 5 percent of what it was in
l950.
Another factor, exchange rate variability, has worked to raise foreign
exchange transactions costs since currencies began to float. lb make a
market in foreign exchange, banks have to take open positions in foreign
currency, even if only briefly, and the riskiness of doing so has gone up'-11—
with the variability of exchange rates. As a result, bid—ask spreads have
generally been higher since 1973 than in the past.8 Nevertheless, they are
still on average small—not high enough to create much of a deterrent to
investors' shifting their portfolios in response to a change in the
attractiveness of a country's assets.
The result of these reduced costs is a very high volume of financial
transactions internationally. For example, a survey by the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York in March 1986 documented a very high level of turnover in
the New York foreign exchange market: $50 billion a day among banks, 92
percent above the previous survey in April 1983, and $26 billion a day
among non—bank financial institutions, up 84 percent over 3 years
earlier,9 The volume of foreign exchange trading was evengreater in
London at $90 billion a day.1°
Due to economies of scale, transactions costs tend to be lower in
currencies that are widely used in trade and financial transactions. The
U.S. dollar has been the world's vehicle currency ever since it inherited
the role from the pound sterling early in the century. A non—U.S. resident
wishing to buy assets of a third country generally must buy dollars first,
before converting them into the third currency. Banks and large corpora-
tions around the world hold dollar transactions balances •In1985 over 60
percent of international bond issues were denominated in dollars, as can be
seen from Thble 2. A disproportionately high share of world trade is also
invoiced in dollars.
Other currencies also play a role in international transactions •In
ascending order of transactions costs in the 90—day forward markets, as
measured by the percentage bid—offer spread in the period September 1982——12—
December 1985, are: the mark, yen, Canadian dollar, Dutch guilder, pound,
and Swiss franc." This ranking of the currencies corresponds roughly to
their ranking in volume of foreign exchange trading in New York: mark,
yen, pound, Swiss franc, Canadian dollar, French franc,and Dutch
guilder.'2 In the 1980g. there has been talk of the yen beginning to play
a more central role. The use of the yen as a currency in which to invoice
trade, issue bonds, and hold reserves, is indeed increasing relative to the
low levels of the past. The share of yen—denominated issues in inter-
national bond markets has gone from 5 .2 percent in 1982 to 10 .4 percent in
1986, including many U.S. borrowers. This is now a greater share than that
of the Deutsche mark, as can be seen in Table 2.13 However, there is
little prospect of the dollar being seriously challenged as the world's
vehicle currency.
One might also include the cost of obtaining information in the
category of transactions costs, as another barrier discouraging residents
of one country from holding assets in another •Informationcosts are
relevant, for example, for mortgage holdings because of the difficulty of
evaluating the credit—worthiness of the borrower. Foreigners hold essen-
tially no mortgages in the United States, while Americans in the aggregate
hold about 25 percent of their portfolio in that form. Information costs
are not a problem f or U.S. 1'reasury securities on the other hand; indeed
the safety and liquidity of U.S. government securities is so attractive to
foreigners that they hold about 43 percent of their U.S. portfolio in that
form, as compared to about 21 percent for Americans.'4 Eurobonds issued by
well—known U.S. corporations have also been very popular with foreigners in
recent years for the same reason.Table 2
International Bond Markets, 1982—First Half 1986
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17.1 27.3 25.2 18.4 6.4Table 2
International Bond Markets, 1982—First Half 1986
(billions of U.s. dollars)
1982 19831984 1985 1986 J./
Euro-Deutsche mark issues 3.3 4.0 4.3 9.5 18.2
Foreign Deutsche mark issues 2.1 2.6 2.4 1.7
Total International Deutsche markissues5.4 6.6 6.7 11.2 18.2
Borrowers: (percent of total)
Austria 9.1
Germany 1.5 6.0 5.7 13.8 24.6
United states 11.5 4.2 9.3 9.7 7.4
EEC institutions 16.2 15.5 15.5 5.3 8.0
International development
organizations 13.8 37.021.2 15.0 12.0
Euro—Swiss franc issues 0.1 -— --
Foreign swiss franc issues 11.3 13.5 13.1 15.0 23.5
Total international Swiss franceissues11.413.513.1 15.0 23.5
Borrowers: (percent of total)
Austrlaia 3.0 1.7 5.3 7.9 4.7
Canada 11.3 9.2 7.6 7.3 3.6
Japan 32.9 49.344.4 45.1 30.5
united States 13.0 8.9 9.5 19.0 26.3
International development.
organizations 10.8 9.911.2 11.7 4.7Table 2
International Bond Markets, 1982-First Half 1986
(billions of U.S. dollars)
1982 19831984 19851986 1/
Other Euro—bond issues 4.1 6.7 10.9 22.9 37.7
Other foreign bond issues 2.4 2.3 3.1 3.2 3.1
Total other international bond issues 6.5 9.0 14.0 26.1 40.8
International bond issues 75.477.1 109.5 166.4 219.3
Source: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Financial
Statistics Monthly.
1' First half 1986 annualized.Table 3
Foreign versus Domestic Holdings of Financial Assets, 1984
(billions of dollars)
Foreign Holders Domestic Holders
Amount1% of Total2 Amount2% of Total2
Checkable deposits
and currency $ 19.7 4.4% $ 582.2 7.1%




Long-term U.S. 1,709.5 20.8
government securities120.8
Other short—term paper40.9 9.1 266.4 3.2
Corporate bonds 61.8 13.8 568.1 7.2
State-local
government securities 0.0 0.0 543.6 6.6
Mortgages 0.0 0.0 2,028.9 24.7
Corporate equities 94.5 21.0 2,090.3 25.6
Total 449.1 100.0 8,201.3 100.0
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Flow of Funds
(various issues).
Notes: Short—term 13.5> government securities include marketable securities
only. Other short—term paper includes commercial paper and bankers
acceptances. Foreign holdings of corporate equities exclude foreign direct
investment. Totals exclude small time and saving deposits, money market
mutual funds, interbank claims, and other miscellaneous assets.
2At year—end.
From Beniamin Friedman, "Implications of the U.S. Net Capital Inflow," in R.
Hafer, ed., How Open is the U.S. Economy?, Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath.—13--
2. pital controls
In many countries, government controls have been serious barriers to
the international flow of capital. The postwar international economic
system established at Bretton Woods did not incorporate a presumption,
analogous to the one incorporated regarding international trade, about the
undesirability of government intervention in international capital markets.
The more common use of controls is to discourage the outflow of
capital from a weak—currency country, as in many developing countries, or
as in the United States in the l960s and early 1970s. Sit they are also
sometimes used to discourage capital from flowing into a country, when it
wishes to avoid a real appreciation of its currency or is worried about a
potential loss in monetary control. For example, Germany and Switzerland
had special taxes on interest payments to nonresidents, and maintained
other measures to discourage foreigners from holding assets in their
countries, until 1975.15 Though the controls on capital inflow into
Germany and Switzerland, like the controls on capital outflow from the
United States, were never very effective, their removal no doubt
facilitated part of the increased U.S. acquisition of foreign assets in the
mid—1970s that shows up in Table 1.
The United Kingdom maintained controls to discourage capital outflows
until 1979. St when Margaret Thatcher came to office, Britain too joined
the club of countries with essentially open financial markets, which by
then consisted of the United States, Canada, Germany, Switzerland, and the
Netherlands.
An interesting case is Japan. Until relatively recently, Japan had
very highly regulated capital markets, both domestically and with respect—'4—
tointernational transactions. In the period 1975—78, the Japanese con-
trols worked to discourage capital inflow, with the aim of dampening the
appreciation of the yen. Foreigners were not allowed to hold gensald (a
three—month repurchase agreement) and other Japanese assets•Thatthe
controls worked to discourage capital inflow can be seen by looking at the
differential in interest rates between gensaki in lbkyo and three—month
Euro—yen in London, which averaged 1.84 percentage points:'6 If it were
not for the controls, investors would not have been willing to hold biro—
yen when a higher interest rate was available in Tokyo.
When the yen began to depreciate rapidly in 1979, the Japanese moved
quickly to remove restrictions on foreign purchases of Japanese assets.
The differential between the gensaki and Siro—yen interest rates dropped
sharply. Indeed, the London rate exceeded the Tokyo rate after April 1979,
although the differential was relatively small.17 This is evidence that
Japanese controls on capital inflow were liberalized more quickly than
controls on capital outflow, with the objective of dampening the depreci-
ation of the yen against the dollar, If some barriers to capital outflow
had not remained, Japanese investors would not have been willing to hold
assets in Tokyo when a higher interest rate on comparable yen securities
was available in London.
A controversy arose in October 1983 when some American businessmen,
alarmed by devastating competition from Japanese exporters, convinced top
officials in the U.S.freasuryDepartment, despite the evidence just cited,
thatthe Japanese Government was still using some form of capital market
restrictions to keep the value of the yen lower than itwouldotherwise
be. There followed a campaign by the U.S. Government to induce the—15—
Japanese to adopt a whole list of measures further liberalizing their
financial markets. This campaign caine to fruition in the May 1984
Yen/Dollar Agreement between the U.S. Treasury and the Japanese Ministry of
Finance •Measuresliberalizing capital inflows included the elimination of
the "designated company" system that restricted foreign direct investment
in 11 companies. Measures liberalizing capital outflows included relax-
ation of restrictions on nonresident issue of yen bonds (called Samurai
bonds when sold in the Japanese market), relaxation of "administrative
guidance" on the part of the Ministry of Finance over overseas lending by
Japanese banks, and permission to Japanese residents to purchase foreign—
issued commercial paper and certificates of deposit. The Ministry of
Finance retained ceilings on foreign security holdings by insurance com-
panies and trust banks, equal to 10 percent of total assets, until the
ceilings began to become binding in early 1986, at which point they were
raised to a much higher level.
The result of the liberalization was an increase in net capital
outflows: The Japanese rate of acquisition of long—term assets abroad
jumped from $32,459 billion in 1984 to $56,775 billion in 1985,18 the
majority of it in the form of portfolio investment, as shown in Table 4.
The positive offshore—onshore interest differential, which had been 50
basis points (briefly) as recently as November 1983, disappeared altogether
in 1984.19 Furthermore, the yen depreciated another 8 percent against the
dollar in 1984. In short, the Yen/Dollar Agreement was successful at
increasing Japan's integration into world financial markets, but not at
promoting capital inflow into Japan or a short—term appreciation of the yen
if that was its goal.Memorandum:
Net banking flows —621 1664 L2243 —4020 —13144
1. Minus sign indicates capital outflow.
2. Excluding foreign investors' "Gensaki" transactions (bond transactions
with agreements to repurchase usually within three months). Since the
liberalization in 1979 up to the end of 1961, although short-term in




Long-term capital movements1 in
(millions of U.S. dollars)
1976 1977 1978
Foreign capital1 3575 2063 2483
Direct investment 113 21 8
Portfolio investment2 1595 1256 1654
















































































Long-term capital movements1 in Japan
(millions of U.s. dollars)
1982 1963 1984 1985
Foreign capital1 12,44914,759 7,124 17,273
Direct investment 439 416 —10 642
Portfolio investment2 7,579 8,485 —156 3851
Import credits —6 8 3 29
Loans —181 —37 —77 —75
Bonds 4,281 5,663 7,350 12,890
Others 337 224 14 —64
Japanese capital —27,418 —32,459 —56,775—81,815
Direct investment —4,540—3,612—5,965 —6,452
Portfolio investment —9,743 —16,024 —30,795—59,773
Export credits —3,239—2,589 —4,937 —2,817
Loans —7,902—8,425 —11,922 —10,427
Others —1,994—1,809—3,156 —2,346
Net3 —14,969 —17,700 —49,651—64,542
Memorandum:
Net banking flows —35 3,570 —17,560—10,848
1. Minus sign indicates capital outflow.
2. Excluding foreign investors' "Gensaki" transactions (bond transactions
with agreements to repurchase usually within three months). Since the
liberalization in 1979 up to the end of 1981, although short—term in
nature, those transactions had been classified as long-term captal
movements.
3. Actual rate.
Source: Bank of Japan, Balance of Payments Monthly in OECD Economic Survey,
JAPAN, August 1985 and November 1986.Table 5
Deviations from Covered Interest Parity
September 1982 to October 1985
in Percentage Points
Local interest rate —Londoneurodollar interest rate
-Londonforward discount (3 month maturity)
Root Mean
Mean Sample Squared 95%
Country ErrorS.D. S.D. Error Bound
United Kingdom -.02 .05 .27 .27 .45
West Germany .50** .03 .20 .54 .84
Netherlands .25** .02 .13 .28 .50
Canada _.13** .02 .13 .28 .50
Switzerland —.06 .05 .73 .73 1.47
Group 1 —.13 .10 .33 .74
Malaysia _1.53** .15 .89 1.77 3.39
Hong Kong .18* .07 .43 .47 1.01
Singapore ...•47** .08 .50 .68 1.21
Group 2 _.60** .13 .61 1.12
Mexico _17.89** 2.00 12.02 21.55 37.83
South Africa _1.32** .14 .81 1.55 3.09
Greece _9.39** 1.17 7.03 11.73 20.45
Saudi Arabia _2.21** .20 1.20 2.52 4.23
Group 3 _7.81** 1.44 5.27 12.44Table 5
Deviations froth Covered Interest Parity
September 1982 to October 1985
in Percentage Points
Local interest rate —Londoneurodollar interest rate























































Data source: Barclay's Bank
2.65
.41 2.47 2.59 3.59





As of early 1986, only France, of the largest industrial countries,
maintained capital controls that were clearly binding by the test of
interest rate differentials. These are controls on capital outflow that
were tightened when the Socialists came to office in 1981. &it even the
French, like the Italians, are in the process of liberalizing. The
offshore—onshore differential, which was 3.88 percent in March 1986,20
vanished thereafter with the election of Jacques thirac, at least
temporarily.
In the Pacific region, Australia and New Zealand have recently removed
their capital controls, and Hong Kong and Singapore have had open financial
markets for some time. Elsewhere among developing countries, however,
markets remain heavily controlled. Table 5 shows onshore—offshore interest
differentials for a cross section of 24 countries. Many have differentials
that are highly variable and significantly negative on average, indicating
effective controls on the outflow of capital to the world market.21
3.Thxes
Taxes are a determinant of international capital flows that might be
considered a sort of government control. Bit it is more common that
avoiding taxes is an incentive to invest abroad than paying taxes is a
barrier to it. -
Themere fact that the citizens of one country are taxed at a higher
rate than those of another does not necessarily create an incentive for
capital flows, assuming both groups of citizens are taxed at the same rate
on their foreign interest earnings as on their domestic earnings. Bit in
practice, investors can sometimes evade taxes by keeping their money in tax—17--
havens, in the Caribbean andelsewhere.The United States has to an extent
played the role of tax haven in recent years. U.S. borrowers have offered
bearer bonds, whose ownership depends on physical possession rather than
registry, to eager investors in Fhrope and latin America.22
The requirement that banks hold a certain fraction of their deposits
in the form of reserves, rather than lending them out at market interest
rates, might be thought of as another tax. U.S. reserve requirements were
one reason for the growth of the Eliromarket in the 1960s and 1970s. Banks
do not have to hold reserves against their offshore deposits and for that
reason are willing to pay a higher interest rate on deposits in the Eliro—
market than on deposits in the United States •Thedifferential in three—
month interest rates between the &irocurrency market and the U.S. interbank
market exceeded 100 basis points in 1980, as the second column of table 6
indicates.
By the early 1980s, discouraging capital outflow was no longer a goal
for the United States, and authorities were concerned that the U.S. banking
industry was losing business to Eliro—banks. Beginning December1981, U.S.
banks were allowed to participate in a sort of domestic Eurornarket by
establishing International knking Facilities (IBF5), which are simply a
separate set of deposit accounts without reserve requirements.23 There
followed a large shift in accounts from overseas offices of U.S. banks to
the offices at home, the majority in New York. hit the change is to be
thought of as a shift in the location at which banking services are pro-
vided, rather than as a net capital inflow: &th claims and liabilities to
foreigners were shifted to U.S. banks.
An important factor in determining international capital flows is—18—
withholding taxes. Until recently, the United States and most other major
countries withheld income taxes on bond interest paid to foreigners, unless
the foreign residents fell under bilateral tax treaties, on the theory that
the income might otherwise escape taxation altogether. .it in July 1984,
the United States abolished its withholding tax.24 This move was an
inducement to foreign investment in the United States •WestGermany,
France and Japan have since also found it necessary or desirable to abolish
their own withholding taxes, in order to "remain competitive" in the eyes
of international investors. Now most countries are potential tax havens
for residents of other countries.
4. Default riskandother Political rislC
Acorporationor other borrower that has a possibility of defaulting
on its obligations has to pay a correspondingly higher interest rate to
compensate lenders for that possibility. For example, the reason investors
in the early l980s were willing to hold deposits in U.S. banks at lower
interest rates than could be earned in the Euromarket, in the absence of
controls on capital outflow from the United States, may be that they
thought there was a greater risk of default in the Euromarket. The
differential baetween the Sirodollar and domestic deposit rates cannot be
explained solely by the difference created by reserve requirements on the
side of banks' costs. Figure 1 shows that the differential existed even
when the U.S. deposit rate is adjusted for reserve requirements.
While U.S. government debt has always been considered close to free of
default—risk, the 1980s debt crisis has forcefully established the point
that governments can default. Indeed, in many Latin American and other













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































DefaultRisk Premia on ForeignBonds, 1981_851
(U.S. dollars)
Returnson Foreign Bonds Difference inRates
World BankMexicoBrazil of Return'
(1) (2) (3) (2)—(1) (3)—(1)
1981
July 14.99 13.66 14.63 —1.33 —0.36
August 15.33 13.71 14.69 —1.62 —0.64
September 16.42 13.18 15.07 —3.24 —1.35
October 16.89 14.15 15.13 —2.74 —1.76
November 16.46 14.21 15.20 —2.25 —1.26
December 14.03 14.30 13.90 0.27 —0.13
1982
.
January 15.36 13.29 13.84 —2.07 —1.52
February 15.63 13.33 13.88 —2.31 —1.76
March 14.98 13.41 13.96 —1.57 —1.02
April 14.96 13.51 14.03 —1.45 —0.93
May 14.56 13.55 14.09 —1.01 —0.47
June 15.22 13.62 14.17 —1.60 —1.05
July 15.11 13.69 14.24 —1.42 —0.87
August 14.11 15.86 15.19 1.75 1.08
September 13.30 17.15 15.59 3.65 2.29
October 11.93 18.05 15.24 6.12 3.31
November 11.28 18.43 14.47 7.15 3.19
December 11.26 18.36 12.94 7.10 1.68Table 7 (continued, page 2)
Default Risk Premia on Fc:eign Bonds, 1981_851
(U.S. dcLlars)
Returns on Foreign Bonds Difference in Rates
World BankMexicoBrazil of Return1
(1) (2) (3) (2)—(1) (3)—(1)
1983
January 10.79 18.43 13.72 7.64 2.93
February 10.79 18.59 13.79 7.80 3.00
March 10.58 18.71 13.87 8.13 3.29
April 10.49 18.63 13.58 8.14 3.09
May 10.31 16.93 13.41 6.62 3.10
June 10.65 17.05 13.59 6.40 2.94
July 11.10 17.17 13.96 6.07 2.86
August 11.88 17.05 14.32 5.17 2.44
September 11.47 17.12 14.42 5.65 2.95
October 11.22 16.77 14.73 5.55 3.51
November 11.40 15.77 14.72 4.37 3.32
December 11.55 13.21 14.73 1.66 3.18
1984
January 11.44 13.27 14.71 1.83 3.27
February 11.34 13.32 14.54 1.98 3.20
Marchl 11.56 12.51 13.88 0.95 2.32
March112 11.55 12.56 13.86 1.01 2.31
April 11.97 12.43 13.96 0.46 1.99




















January 10.31 12.56 17.02 2.25
February 10.07 12.42 12.63 2.35
March 11.09 12.26 12.73 1.17
Note: The bonds are medium-term seasoned bonds, January







i-Call provisions on the World Bank bonds raise rates of return on these
-
relativeMexican or Brazilian bonds of same risk and maturity. Hence, the
changes over time of the differences in the rates of return are of interest.
2For the World Bank 10,June1987; for Mexico 8 ,March1967; for Brazil
8 ,December1987.
Table 7 (continued, page 3)



















guaranteed than private debt •Evenmany European governments have to pay a
default—risk premium over U.S. Government debt, as shown in figure 2b below.
One cannot look at interest rates on new bank lending to the troubled
debtors after 1982 for a measure of the perceived probability of default.
The banks that have large loans already outstanding, knowing that the
likely alternative is default on the earlier debt, have "involuntarily" had
to put in new money in rescheduling agreements. The new loans have been
made at interest rates that——though maintaining positive fig—leaf spreads
over LIBOK (London Interbank Offered Rate)—are far lower than would com-
pensate them for the true risk. Bat one can estimate the perceived default
risk from the discount at which loans trade on the secondary market. As of
December 1986, banks loans were trading at a discount of 32.9 percent for a
weighted average of 15 problem debtors, as reported in Table 17 of
Dornbusch (this volume) .Thereis also a secondary market in bonds issued
by some of these countries. Before August 1982, when the Mexican debt
crisis first surfaced, the rate of return on Mexican or frazilian bonds was
below that on World Bank bonds. The prices of the bonds fell to a discount
thereafter, so that their rate of return rose above that on World Bank
bonds. The difference, which should be interpreted as a default risk
premia, peaked at 8.14 percent in April 1983 for Mexican bonds and 6.71
percent in January 1985 for Brazilian bonds.25 (See Table 7.)
Many analysts believe that the perceived increased risk of default in
Latin America and elsewhere in the world after August 1982 caused a large
flow of capital to the United States, which was considered a safe haven,
and that this was responsible for the large appreciatiân of the dollar.
That there was massive unrecorded "capital flight" out of latin America is—20--
clear. Comparisons of the current account deficits of countries such as
Mexico, Venezuela, and Argentina with the bank debt incurred suggest there
must have been a large increase in unrecorded overseas claims by citizens
of those countries •Itis less clear that this explains why the demand for
U.S. assets should have been increasing over the entire period 1981—85,
particularly relative to European or Japanese assets as would be necessary
if it were to explain the appreciation of the dollar. If there was a shift
during this period into U.S. assets based on increased perceptions of
safety in the United States, relative to assets held in Europe, then one
would expect interest rates on U.S. assets to decline relative to compa-
rable dollar assets in Europe. This did not happen in short—term interest
ratesFigure 1 shows that the Eurodollar rate actually fell relative to
the domestic U.S. deposit rate after August 1982. Table 6 shows that the
offshore—onshore differential also fell by other measures between 1980—82
and 1983—85. The domestic interest rate can be measured by the U.S.
Treasury bill rate instead of by the interbank rate (first column), and the
offshore rate can be measured in pounds or marks, covered on the forward
exchange market, instead of by the Eurodollar rate (last five columns). In
every case, the short—term interest differential moves the opposite direc-
tion from what the safe—haven hypothesis would predict. (In Section 5
below, we consider analogous long—term interest differentials.)
There are other kinds of risk, besides the risk of outright default,
that can discourage investors from holding a country's assets. Even if the
country does not currently have taxes on interest payments abroad, or on
the repatriation of profits, and does not have controls on the removal of
principal, there is always the possibility that it will enact such policies—21—
in the-future. This is particularly relevant forcountries that have had
capital controls in the past. In the case of directinvestment in less
developed countries, there is the possibility ofnationalization of the
industry. This is one of the reasons why investment inthese càuntries
prior to 1982 usually took the form of banklending rather than direct
investment. All these forms of "political risk"are less applicable to
assets held in the United States than elsewhere, consistentwith the view
of the country as a safe haven for capital. Onthe other hand, U.S.
authorities have in recent years been ready to freezeassets of unfriendly
states, Iran and Libya; and Soviet fears along these lines 30years ago may
have been behind their decision to hold dollarsin London banks—the
genesis of the Ekiromarket ,26
5. Exchange risk
cause of the risk of changes in theexchange rate, assets
denominated in dollars are viewed by investorsas different from assets
denominated in other currencies. This is trueeven in the absence of
transactions costs, capital controls, taxes, politicalrisk, or other
barriers to the movement of capitalacross national boundaries.
There are many ways residents of onecountry can increase their net
investment position in another country withoutincreasing their exposure in
its currency. In the first place, even if allassets were denominated in
the currency of the country where issued, U.S.residents could, for
example, increase their net investment position abroadby buying back
previously issued dollar bonds. A net capital outflowcan be either an
increase in foreign assets or a decrease inliabilities, as the high gross
flow numbers in lSbles 1 or 9 illustrate.—22—
In the second place, an investor can acquire claims on foreigners
without their being denominated in foreign currency, and can acquire assets
denominated in foreign currency without their being claims on foreigners.
Many smaller countries issue bonds denominated in dollars,rather than in
their own currencies, so that they will be more acceptable tointernational
Investors.27 The majority of bank lending to less developed countries has
been denominated in dollars, and the rest in the currencies ofother major
industrialized countries, not that of the borrower. Even the United States
Government issued "Carter bonds" denominated in marks in 1978—79. Corpo-
rations increasingly borrow abroad in foreign currency, either as a foreign
bond issue or in the Euromarket.
At the shorter end of the maturity spectrum, there have been active
forward exchange markets for some time; borrowers are able to hedge foreign
currency liabilities by buying exchange forward,and lenders to hedge
foreign currency assets by selling exchange forward. Atthe longer end of
the maturity spectrun, the rapid growth of currency swaps inthe 19805
allows U.S. corporations to issue Euroyen or Euromark bonds to Japanese,
Germans, or anyone else wishing to hold these currencies,and then to swap
the proceeds into dollars. Finally on the list of ways that currencyof
denomination can be divorced from the location of the asset, the pricesof
equities and direct investment are not fixed in any currency,either
domestic or foreign (though the dollar price of foreign equitiesdoes often
seem to move one—for—one with the exchange rate)
While these ways exist for an investor to buy a foreign asset without
taking a position in foreign currency, not all investors shouldwish to
avoid taking such a position. Unless an investor is indifferent to risk,—23—
or is certain what the future exchange rate will be, or is tied to his own
currency by accounting practices, he should wish to diversify his holdings
among dollars, marks, yen, pounds, francs, etc., so as to reduce the
variability in the value of his overall portfolio. It is easy for an
investor, particularly an American, to slip into the habit of viewing his
own currency as safe and others as risky. This view would assign exchange
risk a purely negative role, a cost to be weighed against other factors
like expected return in the decision to buy foreign currencies•itthe
value of domestic currency is not completely safe, even for an American. A
firm that imports raw materials, intermediate inputs, or other goods from
abroad is vulnerable to an increase in costs from a depreciation of the
domestic currency; such a firm would be wise to take an "open" position in
foreign currency, i.e., to hold some foreign assets or to buy some foreign
exchange on the forward market. (The word "open" is in quotations because
in this case the firm is reducing overall exposure to currency risk, not
increasing it except in the most narrow of accounting senses.) Households
also consume some imported goods, and thus are partially vulnerable to a
depreciation, though there is generally a lag before the depreciation is
passed through to retail prices. Furthermore, the possibility of inflation
in prices of domestically produced goods, whether associated with a change
in the exchange rate or not, provides another reason why the domestic
currency should not be viewed as perfectly safe. The point is that even a
highly risk—averse American might want to hold some foreign currency
assets.
To citizens of smaller, more open, countries, this point is more
important. In countries with a past history of hyperinflation, parti——24—
cularlyin Central Europe and LatinAmerica,the desirability of holding
some foreign currency is well understood even by relatively unsophisticated
citizens. The role of "asset least likely to lose purchasing power" has
been played by various currencies at various times •Inthe l970s, marks
1
andSwiss francs, in addition to gold, were popular. itinthe 1980s, the
U.S. dollar is the currency of choice, in large part due to the firm anti—
inflation policy of the Federal Reserve Board under chairman Paul Voleker.
In countries that are highly unstable monetarily, residents are willing to
give up interest earnings on securities to hold dollars inthe form of
currency. Dollars are known to circulate freely insuch countries as
Argentina and Israel. There are no data on foreign holdings of U.S.
currency, but Cooper (1986, p. 7) conjectures that over $20billion of the
roughly $169 billion in dollar currency in circulation at theend of 1984
was held abroad.
Because exchange rates have become more variable since 1973, and even
since 1980, the typical international investor should be more diversified
among currencies than in the past. Despite this,and despite the low level
of transactions costs and capital controls among major industrialized
countries, residents everywhere appear to hold far less foreign assets,and
far more of their owncountry'sassets, than would be present in a
theoretically well—diversified portfolio. For example, Thble 8 suggests
that most U.S. assets are still held by U.S. residents. Similarly, most
Japanese assets are still held by Japanese residents, and soforth. &it
investors everywhere are increasing their level of diversification, which
explains why U.S. residents are increasing their gross claims on foreigners
even at a time when capital is on net flowing outof Japan (Table 4) .This
process can be expected to continue for many years.Table 8










1962 45.4 1,457.8 3.1
1970 99.0 2,600.0 3.8
1975 183.4 3,507.9 5.2
1980 399.6 6,256.0 6.3
1981 419.7 6,628.0 6.3
1982 414.8 7,250.5 5.7
1983 502.4 8,219.2 6.1
1984 620.8 9,055.6 6.9
1985 788.4 10,663.4 7.4
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Resereve System, Flow of Funds
Accounts, Financial Assets and Liabilities, September 1986. pp. 1—2,
15—16.
'Ibtal credit market debt owed by nonfinancial sectors plus security
credit, trade credit, mutualfund sharesandothercorporate equities.—25—
IV•U.S.(pital Inflowsin the 1980s
The 1980shavewitnessed an historic swing in the U.S. capital
account. In 1980, U.s. residents were on net investing overseas, as they
had for manydecades,at a rate estimated in the last line of Table 9 at
I
$10.4billion a year. By 1982, U.s. residents appear to have been on net
borrowing from abroad, at a rate of $10.5 billion a year. The estimated
rate of net borrowing rose very rapidly, to $41.8 billionth 1983 and
$106.5 billion in 1984, until it reached an apparent plateau in 1985 of
$122.9 billion.28 During this same period, the dollar appreciated sharply.
The balance of payments statistics in Table 9 give some(limited)
insightinto the composition of the net capital inf low. The inflow has
primarily taken the formofforeigners increasing their holdings of U.S.
assets. U.S. residents have not noticeably cashed in their holdings of
foreign assets. In fact, U.S. residents have continued to increase their
investments abroad.
1. U.s. assets abroad
Some have argued that the sharp fall in the recorded rate of U .S.
acquisition of foreign assets, from $110.2 billion in 1982 to $15.0 billion
in 1984 and $25.8 billion in 1985, means that actions by U.S. residents are
dominating the net capital inflow, not actions by foreign residents •29
there are several things to be said against this argument. In the first
place, the recorded stock of U.S. assets abroad continues to rise; it is
only the rate of change that has declined. In the second place, part of
the apparent fall in U.S. investment abroad is an apparent fall in foreign
direct investment between 1980 and 1982—84 (line 5 in Table 9; the recordedTable 9
pitalfla.s in the Balance of Payments, 1980-1985
(billionsof dollars)
(1)U.S. assets abroad, net
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
(increase/capitalcutfiow(—))—86.1—111.0 —121.3 —50.0—23.6 —32.4
(2)U.S. official reserve assets—8.2 —5.2 —5.0—1.2 —3.1—3.9
(3)OtherU.S.Governmentassets —5.2 —5.1 —6.1—5.0 —5.5—2.8
(4)U.S. private assets abroad —72.8 —100.8 —110.2 —43.8—13.0 —25.8
(5) Directi.nvesthent —19.2 —9.6 2.4—0.4 —3.9 —18.8
[(5a)of whichNetherlands
Antilles capital
(decrease/inflow(+))* 2.7 3.5 8.7 3.1 1.7—3.0
(6)Ebreign securities —3.6 —5.8 —8.1—7.0 —5.1—8.0
(7)Otherclaims reported
by U.S. nonbanks —3.2 —1.2 —6.6—6.5 5.1 1.7
(8)Otherclaims reported
by U.S. banks —46.8—84.2 —111.1 —29.9—11.1—0.7
(9)Ftreignassets in the U.S. net
(increase/capital inflow (+)) 58.183.394.185.5102.8 127.1
(10) Fbreignofficialassets
inthe U.S. 15.5 5.0 3.66.0 3.0—1.3
(11) Otherforeign assets
In the U.S. 42.6 78.4 90.579.5 99.7 128.4
(12) Direct investnent 16.9 25.2 13.811.9 25.417.9
(13) U.S. Treasury securities2.6 2.9 7.1 8.7 23.120.5Table 9 (itinued,page 2)
Capital flows in the Balance of Payrrits, 1980-1985
(billions ofdollars)
(14) Other U.S.securities 5.57.2 6.48.612.850.9
(15) Otherliabilitiesreported
byU.S. nonbanks 6.9 0.9 —2.4—0.1 4.7—1.2
(16) Otherliabilitiesreported
by U.S. banks 10.742.165.550.333.840.4
(17) O.irrent acccxint balance 1.9 6.3—9.1 —46.6 —106.5 117.7





balance (6)+(13)+(14)+(Sa) 7.2 7.8 14.113.4 32.560.4
(21) Other claimsand liabiities
(3)+(7)+(8)+(l5)+(16) —37.6 47.5 47.4 8.8 26.937.4
22) Official reserves (2)+(10) 8.5 0.9 1.4 4.8 —0.1—5.2
23) New SDRallocations 1.2 1.1
24) Statistical discrepancy
—[(17)+(18)+)22)+(23)] 25.0 20.3 36.311.1 27.323.0
25) Estimated private capital
accaint balance (19)+(24)** —10.4 —7.2 10.541.8106.5 122.8
wrce: Survey of Oirrent Business, June 1986, Table 1
*Sairce 198-61, Survey of Oarrent Business, June 1983, Table D, p. 37; 1982
revised) Dept. of CYinrerce; 1983-85, SCB, June 1986, Table D.
tAssurts statistical discrepancy is entirely unrecorded capital inflows.—26—
figure for 1982 even shows a net decrease in the U.S. foreign direct
investment position) .hitthis fall in recorded direct investment is in
part due to the problem of U.S. corporations obtaining funds via subsidi-
aries in the Netherlands Antilles. When these credit items are moved from
the direct investment numbers to foreign purchases of U.S. corporate
securities where they belong, foreign direct investment shows less of a
decline in the early 1980s 3O
In the third place, and quantitatively much more importantly, the
reported slowdown in the period 1983—85 in U.S. banks' acquisition of
claims on foreigners (line 8 in Thble 9) relative to 1981—82 can be traced
to exaggeration of the 1981—82 figures by the establishment of IBFs
(International Banking Facil-ities) in the United States beginning in
December 1981. $44 billion of IBFliabilitiesto foreigners originated in
1981, and $72 billion in 1982. Since these increased liabilities were
matched by increased claims when the accounts were moved from overseas, the
acquisition of foreign assets reported by U.S. banks is estimated to have
been exaggerated by these amounts.31 Thus, the decline in acquisition of
foreign assets in the subsequent years is exaggerated similarly. More
generally in the case of bank—reported flows, the statistics need say
nothing about the residence of investors on whose behalf the banks are
reporting. In the case of interbank transactions, the distinction between
increases in liabilities and decreases in claims is particularly lacking in
economic significance.—27--
2.Foreign direct lnvestaent IntheUnited States
The side of the balance sheet covering foreign investments in the
UnitedStates is perhaps the more interesting, as the country is becoming
increasingly dependent on the willingness of foreigners to continue to
increase their lending. From lines 11 to 16 in ible 9, foreign acqui-
sition of U.S. assets during 1983—85 consisted 18 percent of direct
Investment, 17 percent purchases of U.S. Treasury securities, 24 percent
purchases of Other securities, 1 percent other U.S. liabilities to
unaffiliated foreigners reported by U.S. nonbanking concerns, and 40
percent U.S. liabilities reported by U.S. banks not included elsewhere.
Table 10 shows the foreign direct investment position in the United
States at the end of 1985. The investment is mostly in the hands of
Europeans: 66 percent. Nine percent is held by canada, 10 percent by
Japan, 9 percent by Latin America, and only 5 percent by the Middle East
and all others. The largest category is in manufacturing (33 percent),
followed by trade (18 percent), petroleum (15 percent), real estate (10
percent), banking (6 percent), insurance (6 percent), other finance (3
percent), andotherindustries (8 percent).
A highly publicized component of foreign direct investment in the
United States is the purchase or construction of factories by foreign
manufacturers to avoid current or threatened U.S. restrictions against
imports, most notably in the Japanese automobile industry. Japanese direct
investment is indeed increasingly rapidly: $3.1 billion in 1985 on U.S.
figures, or $5.4 billion on Japanese accounting, kit it is still rela-
tively small, and it is concentrated in trade and in financial services.
The Japanese figures show that 68 percent of the (cumulative) directTable 10.(L-1)





All countries 164,583 25,400 51,802 31,219 10,326
Canada 15,286 1,544 4,115 1,734 1,219
Europe 108,211 23,142 39,083 16,934 5,740
European Communities (10) 96,555 22,813 32,990 15,238 5,335
Belgium 2,548 (d) 471 296 (d)
France 6,591 (d) 5,368 728 420
Germany 12,330 71 4,389 4,256 272
Italy 1,438 (d) 333 (d) 298
Luxembourg 753 (d) 74 (d) (d)
Netherlands 33,728 9,981 12,497 2,787 1,427
United Kingdom 38,387 10,991 9,719 6,732 2,194
Denmark, Greece,
and Ireland 779 (d) 139 216 214
Other Europe 11,655 329 6,093 1,696 405
Sweden 2,258 307 1,048 650 (d)
Switzerland 8,146 19 4,774 794 (d)
-
Other 1,251 3 271 252 271
Japan 16,044 —88 2,460 9,941 1,853
Australia, New Zealand,
and South Africa 2,152 57 362 (d) 51Table 10.(L-2)




Latin America 16,201 656 5,537 2,027 665
South and Central America 2,859 50 981 44 (d)
Panama 1,924 45 959 14 (d)
Other 935 5 22 30 574
Other Western Hemisphere 13,343 606 4,555 1,983 (d)
Bermuda 1,370 110 306 363 0
Netherlands Antilles 10,935 452 4,092 1,394 (d)
United Kingdom Islands,
Caribbean 866 (d) 140 186 16
Other 172 (d) 18 40 0
Middle East 5,336 15 116 (d) 481
Israel 525 6 97 (d) 319
Other 4,811 9 20 (d) 162
Other Africa, Asia,
andPacific 1,353 75 128 291 318
Memorandum—OPEC1 4,892 12 —21 (d) 268
*Lessthan $500,000().
(d) Suppressed to avoid disclosure of data of individual companies.
1. See footnote 1, table 3.
Source: Survey of Current BusinessTable 10. (CL-i)




except ance estate industries
banking
All countries 5,633 8,922 17,761 13,519
Canada 608 1,418 2,844 1,804
Europe 3,457 6,748 8,255 4,850
European Communities (10) 2,879 5,424 7,714 4,163
Belgium (d) (d) 10 (d)
France —623 91 66 (d)
Germany 335 1,295 966 745
Italy (d) (d) (d) B
Luxembourg i21 0 (d) 8
Netherlands 1,970 i,445 2,47i 1,152
United Kingdom 743 2,548 4,135 1,325
Denmark, Greece,
and Ireland 2 (d) 42 50
Other Europe 579 1,325 541 688
Sweden (d) 119 0 (d)
Switzerland 536 1,152 393 (d)
Other (d) 54 148 (d)
Japan 513 138 744 482
Australia, New Zealand,
and South Africa (d) (d) 120 (d)Table 10.(CL-2)




except ance estate industries
banking
Latin America 861 580 4,664 1,212
South and Central America 115 (d) 372 186
Panama 108 (d) 256 6
Other 7 (d) 116 181
Other Western Hemisphere 746 (d) 4,292 1,025
Bermuda 7 (d) 151 (d)
Netherlands Antilles 643 (d) 3,715 543
United Kingdom Islènds,
Caribbean 109 (d) 369 10
Other —13 0 57 (d)
Middle East (d) 0 709 (d)
Israel (d) 0 0 —6
Other 9 0 709 (d)
Other Africa, Asia,
and Pacific 28 (d) 423 (5)
Memorandum-OPEC1 9 0 707 (d)
*Lessthan $500,000().
(d) Suppressed to avoid disclosure of data of individual companies.
1. See footnote 1, table 3.
Source: Survey of Current BusinessTable 10.(CR—1)





All countries 182,951 28,123 60,798 34,212 11,503
Canada 16,678 1,659 5,130 2,143 1,332
Europe 120,906 25,437 46,515 17,611 5,963
European Communities (10) 106,004 25,114 37,553 15,738 5,616
Belgium 2,288 (d) 477 340 (d)
France 6,295 (d) 5,485 581 483
Germany 14,417 (d) 6,198 4,726 222
Italy 1,401 (d) 273 (d) 300
Luxembourg 584 .(d) 86 (d) (d)
Netherlands 36,124 11,315 12,986 2,544 1,570
United Kingdom 43,766 12,246 11,884 6,847 2,539
Denmark, Greece,
and Ireland 1,129 (d) 165 404 199
Other Europel 14,902 323 8,961 1,873 347
Sweden 2,384 296 1,132 790 3
Switzerland 11,040 (d) 7,431 778 98
Other 1,478 (d) 399 305 255
Japan 19,116 31 2,621 11,822 2,176
Australia, New Zealand,
and South Africa 2,702 101 747 (d) 63Table 1O.•(CR-2)





Latin America 17,050 608 5,558 2,099 1,122
South and Central America 3,385 112 803 190 1,041
Panama 2,137 104 842 113 (d)
Other 1,248 8 —39 78 (d)
Other Western Hemisphere 13,665 496 4,755 1,909 80
Bermuda 1,903 97 955 (d) (*)
Netherlands Antilles 10,603 406 3,717 1,364 66
United Kingdom Islands,
Caribbean 983 (d) 63 190 14
Other 177 (d) 19 (d) (*)
Middle East 4,961 (d) 58 (d) 521
Israel 505 (d) 54 (d) 334
Other 4,455 (d) 3 (d) 188
Other Africa, Asia,
and Pacific 1,538 (d) 171 231 327
Memorandum-OPEC1 4,560 19 -36 (d) 188
*Lessthan $500,000(+).
(d) Suppressed to avoid disclosure of data of individual companies.
1. See footnote 1, table 3.
Source: Survey of Current BusinessTable 10




except ance estate industries
banking
All countries 4,708 11,069 18,557 13,982
Canada 513 1.337 2,580 1,985
Europe 2,387 8,921 8,821 5,251
European Communities (10) 1,681 7,497 8,238 4,566
Belgium (d) (d) 9 (d)
France —917 92 26 (d)
Germany (d) 1,656 1,049 697
Italy 25 (d) (d) (d)
Luxembourg 129 0 24 22
Netherlands 2,088 1,975 2,325 1,321
United Kingdom 262 3,727 4,623 1,636
Denmark, Greece,
and Ireland 3 (d) (d) 52
Other Europe 705 1,424 583 685
Sweden —46 (d) 0 (d)
Switzerland 627 1,232 444 (d)
Other 125 (d) 139 (d)
Japan 710 122 1,054 582
Australia, New Zealand,
and South Africa -19 (d) 117 (d)Table 10
Foreign Direct Investment Position in the United Ecates at Year End
(millions of dollars)
1985—
Finance, Insur- Red Other
except ance estate industries
banking
Latin America 917 662 4,808 1,276
South and Central America 132 (d) 307 (d)
Panama 123 (d) 199 1
other 8 4 108 (d)
Other Western Hemisphere 785 (d) 4,501 (d)
Bermuda 5 (d) 110 (d)
Netherlands Antilles 480 24 3,945 602
United Kingdom Islands,
Caribbean 268 (d) 399 (d)
other 12 0 47 (d)
Middle East 186 0 746 (d)
Israel (d) 0 1 4
Other (d) 0 745 (d)
Other Africa, Asia,
and pacific 16 (d) 430 (d)
Memorandum-OPEC1 2 0 737 (0)
*Lessthan $500,000().
(d) Suppressed to avoid disclosure of data of individual companies.
1. See footnote 1, table 3.
Source: Survey of Current Business—28—
investment in North America is in nonmanufacturing industries and only 29
percent in manufacturing industries (5 percent in transportation machinery
and 8 percent in electrical machinery) 32 This is in contrast to U.S.
direct invesment in other countries which as of end—l985 was 41 percent in
manufacturing, 25 percent in petroleum, and only 16 percent in banking,
finance and insurance. (U.S. direct investment in Japan is 51 percent in
manufacturing, 24 percent in petroleum, and only 8 percent in banking,
finance and insurance.)33 Japanese direct investment in manufacturing in
the United States may be important for redirecting trade flows, or forany
transfer of managerial practices that may be taking place; but it is not a
quantitatively substantial part of the capital inf low into the United
States
3.Securitiessalesvs. banking flows
Inthe past, banking transactions have generally been the largest
component of the capital account. Bit in 1984 foreign purchases ofU.S.
securities passed bank—reported liabilities as the largest component of the
capital inflow, either on a gross or net basis.
This trend, which accelerated in 1985, partly reflects the securiti—
zation of international capital markets: the rapidly growing role of
direct investor purchases of bonds and equities, at the expense of bank
intermediation. Some of the reasons that have been suggested for the
decline in banking's share are deregulation and innovation in securities
markets, concern over bank exposure to developing countries, the pressure
on banks to increase their capital/asset ratio, and concern over the
Continental Ulinois &nk crisis in 1984.35 Arapidly growing component ofTable 11.(L—1)
Share of National Currencies
in Total Identified Official Holdings of Foreign Exchange
End of Year 1977_851
(in percent)
1977 197819791980 1981 1982 1983
All countries
U.S. Dollar 80.378.275.269.073.1 71.7 72.2
Pound sterling 1.8 1.8 2.1 3.1 2.2 2.5 2.7
Deutsche mark 9.3 11.212.815.6 13.412.9 12.0
French franc 1.3 1.2 1.4 1.8 1.4 1.3 1.1
Swiss franc 2.3 2.2 2.6 3.3 2.8 2.8 2.4
Netherlands guilder 0.9 0.9 1.1 1.4 1.2 1.2 0.9
Japanese yen 2.5 3.4 3.7 4.5 4.3 4.7 5.0
Unspecified currencies1 1.6 1.1 1.2 1.4 1.4 2.8 3.5
Industrial countries
U.S. dollar 89.486.4 83.477.678.7 76.7 76.0
Pound sterling 0.9 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.8 0.9
Deutsche mark 5.5 7.9 9.714.4 13.1 12.512.9
French franc 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.3
Swiss franc 0.8 1.2 1.5 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8
Netherlands guilder 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.7 0.5
Japanese yen 1.8 2.3 2.6 3.5 3.7 4.4 5.1
Unspecified currencies1 0.7 O.5 0.7 0.6 0.7 2.8 2.9Table 11.(L-2)
Share of National. Currencies
in Total Identified Official Holdings of Foreign Exchange




U.S. dollar 70.966.6 66.3 60.167.1 66.5 68.0
Pound sterling 2.8 3.2 3.4 5.4 3.8 4.4 4.8
Deutsche mark 13.315.9 16.216.713.9 13.3 11.1
French franc 2.3 2.3 2.2 3.1 2.5 2.4 2.0
Swiss franc 3.9 3.6 3.8 4.9 3.9 3.9 3.6
Netherlands guilder 1.2 1.5 1.6 2.0 1.6 1.7 1.3
Japanese yen 3.2 4.9 4.8 5.6 5.0 5.1 4.9
Unspecified currencies1 2.5 1.9 1.7 2.2 2.2 2.8 4.2
Source: International Monetary Fund, Annual Report, 1986.Table 11.(R-1)
Share of National Currencies
in Total Identified Official Holdings of Foreign Exchange






U.S. Dollar 70.565.1 56.4
Pound sterling 3.1 3.2 2.9
Deutsche mark 12.815.5 14.2
French franc 1.1 1.2 1.].
Swiss franc 2.1 2.4 2.2
Netherlands guilder 0.8 1.0 1.0
Japanese yen 5.7 7.6 7.0
Unspecified currencies1 3.8 3.9 15.2
Industrial countries
U.S. dollar 71.663.2 48.9
Pound sterling 1.6 2.0 1.7
Deutsche mark 14.7 19.2 16.4
French franc 0.4 0.5 0.4
Swiss franc 1.4 1.8 1.5
Netherlands guilder 0.6 1.0 0.9
Japanese yen 6.1 8.5 7.3
Unspecified currencies1 3.5 3.9 22.9Table 11.(R-2)
Share of National Currencies
in Total Identified Official Holdings of ?oreign Exchange






U.S. dollar 69.267.5 67.5
Pound sterling 4.84.7 4.7
Deutsche mark 10.6 10.9 10.9
French franc 1.9 2.1 2.1
Swiss franc 3.0 3.1 3.1
Netherlands guilder 1.0 1.1 1.1
Japanese yen 5.3 6.5 6.5
Unspecified currencies1 4.1 4.0 4.0
Source: International Monetary Fund, Annual Report, 1986.NOTES TO TABLE 11, PAGES 4-5
i-Starting with 1979, the SDR value of European currency units (ECU5)
issued against 1.1.5. dollars is added to the SDR value of U.s. dollars, but
the SDR value of ECUs issued against gold is excluded from the total
distributed here. For classification of countries in groups shown here, see
Appendix IX. Only selected countries that provide information about the
currency composition of their official holdings of foreign exchange are
included in this table.
2The column is for comparison and indicates thecurrency composition of
reserves when holdings of ECus are treated as a separate reserve asset,
unlike the earlier columns starting with 1979 as is explained in the
preceding footnote. The share of ECUs in total foreign exchange holdings
was 10.9 percent for all countries and 20.2 percent for the industrial
countries in 1985.
3This residual is equal to the difference between total identified
reserves and the sum of the reserves between the seven currencies listed in
the table.
4The calculations here rely to a greater extent on Fund staff estimates
than do those provided for the group of industrial countries.—29—
the increased purchases of securities by foreigners consists of issues of
Eurobonds by U.S. corporations: $38 billionin1985 as compared to $7
billion in 1983.36 Purchases of all non—Treasury U.S. securities reached
$50.9 billion in 1985, over nine times higher than the level of five years
earlier.
Anotherlarge chunk is increased purchases of U.S. Government bonds.
In 1984 the U.S. Treasury began a new effort to tap foreign savings and
help finance the enormous federal budget deficit by issuing "foreign—
targeted registered obligations" directly into the Eurobond market.
Foreign purchases of all Treasury securities reached $20.5 billion in 1985,
almost eight times higher than the level of five years earlier. A remark-
able 83 percent of the foreign purchases were by Japanese residents.37
This reflects the magnitude of the capital inflow from Japan, and the
relative preference of Japanese investors for U.S. bonds rather than
equities, though it has been argued that Japanese purchases of Eurodollar
bonds may exceed their purchases of U.S. Treasury bonds.38
4•Officialreserve holdings ofdollars
Until 1973, the holdings of internationalreserves by central banks
werethought of as endogenous, as accommodating the decisions of private
residents regarding either investment or current account transactions.
Withthe end of the &etton Woods system, the obligation for the major
central banks to intervene in the foreign exchange market ended. Most
continued to intervene as it suited them, the Thsropean and Japanese central
banks much more so than the U.S •authorities•Forexample, their purchases
ofdollars to try to dampen the dollar depreciation of 1977—78 was several—30—
times greater than the record U.S. current account deficits. One could
think of the major central banks during this period playing to an extent
the same role they did under the Bretton Woods system: financing U.S.
current account (and private capital account) imbalances.
In the early l980s, as the dollar swung from a level perceived as too
low to a level perceived as too high, the European and Japanese central
banks reversed the direction of their intervention, now selling dollars to
dampen the depreciation of their own currencies. &xt even in 1985, when
the U.S. Treasury under Secretary James Baker abandoned its previous policy
of benign neglect and spearheaded a new cooperative effort to get the
dollar down, the quantity of intervention was relatively small. Reported
U.S. liabilities to official institutions in Western Furope fell by only
$7 .3 billion between the end of 1980 and the end of 1985 .Dollar
holdings by most smaller central banks increased steadily over this period
(except in 1985); they either were unconcerned about the strength of the
dollar or viewed themselves as. too small to affect it, and were more inter-
ested in the high rates of return they could earn on dollar securities.
The result was the positive numbers in line 10 of Thble 9.
The U.S. statistics probably underestimate the dollar holdings of
central banks, those in developing countries in particular, because they do
not count Eurodollar holdings. Statistics on reserve holdings reported by
the central banks themselves show greater increases in quantity terms in
1983_85,40 It is as if central banks in the aggregate acted like
"destabilizing speculators," rather than "leaning into the wind" to resist
swings in the dollar 41 The tendency for central banks to shift their
portfolios in the same direction that currency values are already moving is—31—
necessarily even stronger when reserves are reported in value terms. As
Table 11 shows, the share of official reserve portfolios allocated to
dollars declined rapidly from 1977 to 1980, and then rose from 1980 to the
end of 1984, like the value of the dollar itself.
Despite the "Plaza Accord" of September 22, 1985, at which the five
largest central banks agreed to coordinated intervention in order to bring
down the dollar, such dollar sales were not very evident in the 1985
figures, andthereis even less reason to think that they will dominate the
figures in 1986 or in the future. Perhaps central banks should be lumped
together with other foreign residents in their portfolio behavior ,42
V •tesof turn
What could cause swings in net capital flows of the magnitude seen in
the 1980s? From thestandpoint of macroeconomic policy, the most important
determinantsof capital flows between countries are expected rates of
return.U.S. interestrates increased sharply after 1980. Interest rates
inother major industrialized countries also increased, but not as much.
The differential between the U.S. ten—year interest rate and a weighted
average of other countries' ten—year interest rates averaged zero in 1976—
80, but rose to about 2 percent by 1982, and rose further to about 3 per-
cent in 1984. This increase in the differential rate of return on U .S,
assets is widely considered the most important cause of the net capital
inflow that began in the early 1980s. hit measuring expected rates of
return is not as straightforward as might appear. For equities or direct
investment, the rate of return is uncertain, andinvestorstreat such—32—
assets as different from bonds so that one cannot use the bondinterest
rate to measure their expected rate of return. Even fordeposits, loans,
and bonds, where the nominal interest rate is known interms of domestic
currency, the dollar interest rate on U.S. bonds cannot be directly
compared with the mark interest rate on German bonds because of the
likelihood of future changes in the mark/dollar exchangerate.
1.Dollar bondrates in the domestic and biro markets
If we are interested in the investor's decision whetherto invest in
bonds issued in the United States versus bonds issued in otherpolitical
jurisdictions per se, rather than necessarily dollar bonds versus other
currencies, then we can get around the problem of exchange rateuncertainty
by comparing U.S. interest rates to Eurodollar interest rates•Thisis the
same thing we did in Table 7 for three—month deposit rates. Figure 2 shows
four series of long—term dollar interest rates, twoon each side of the
Atlantic. The dominant impression is that the ratesmove together,
suggesting that capital controls or political risk are relatively unimpor-
tant and that arbitrage works relatively well. &t there is stillsome
variation in the differential.
Figure 2a shows the domestic U.S. versus Eurodollar interest rate on
bonds issued by U.S. corporations. In the mid—l970s, therates were
essentially the same. The domestic U.S. interest rates began to rise,
especially in 1980 and 1981, providing a strong incentive for capital to
flow from the Earomarket into the United States. The &irobondrate also
rose, but not by as much. The differential, represented by the solid line
in Figure 2c, reached 3.3 percent in July 1981.Evidently, the capitalFigure 2
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inflow was not large enough to arbitrage it away. It is not clear why U.S.
corporations did not elect to do even more of their borrowing in the
Euromarketat the cheaper rate
Figure 2b shows the U.S. and Eurodollar interest rates for government
bonds.These Eurodollar bonds are issued by European governments, so the
fact that they offered a higher interest rate than the U.S. bonds in the
1970s was presumably compensation for somewhat greater risk of default.
bat when the U.S. rate rose in 1980—81, the Faromarket rate lagged behind,
just as with the corporate bonds; the differential turned positive and
reached 1.7 percent in September 1981. When the U.S. corporate and govern-
ment interest rates fell in mid—1982, the respective Eurobond rates again
lagged behind and the differentials returned to their earlier levels.
The drop in the Euro—U.S. long—term differentials in mid—1982 is
consistent wl.th the idea that investors sought to shift their portfolios
into U.S. assets for "safe haven" reasons associated with the Latin
American debt crisis .''batthe evidence is also consistent with the idea
that U.S. interest rates were merely leading the way and Eurodollar rates
following with a small lag.
2 •U.S•vs.non—dollar interest rates
Figure3ashows the differential between the U.S. long—term government
bondrate and a weighted average of six trading partners' long—term
governmentbond rates (solid line) Thedifferential peaked in June 1984
at 3.19 percent, with the differentials against Germany and Japan somewhat
higher. It then declined over the subsequent two years, falling below 1.00
percent in 1986, though stil. 2.0 percent against Germany and2.8 percent
against Japan as of September 1986.—34—
When comparing incentives to invest in U.S.versusforeign—currency
bonds, we must consider exchange rate expectations in addition to interest
rates •Thisis difficult, because there are many different viewsas to how
exchange rates move, and no way to measure expectations directly. &t it
is possible to get a rough handle on the exchange rateexpectations that
investors must have held during this period.
There is an historical tendency, albeit very slow anderratic, for the
exchange rate eventually to return to a long—run equilibrium in real terms
(that is, adjusted for changes in the price level). The largeappreciation
of the dollar from 1980 to 1984, 35 percent against a weightedaverage of
15 trading partners' currencies, was not much offset by higher inflation
abroad, and so constituted a similar appreciation in real terms, 32
percent Theresult of this loss of competitiveness was the rapidly
growing trade deficit, which reached $113 billion in 1984 and $124 billion
(on a "balance of payments basis") in 1985. It was widely believed atthis
time that the trade situation was unsustainable, that the dollarwas over-
valued and would in the future have to depreciate back to levelsat which
U.S.producerscould compete on world markets. Such expectations of future
depreciation must have had an effect on investor thinking.
There exist surveys of the forecasts made by participants in the
foreign exchange market, and they tend to confirm the idea that thelarge
appreciation of the dollar in the early l980s generated an anticipation of
a future depreciation back to equilibrium. One survey conducted by the
American Express nk Review shows that the forecasteddepreciation of the
dollar one year ahead climbed from approximately zero in the late 1970s
(—0.20 on average in 1976—79) to a peak of 8.47percent in the year 1984.—35—
Another survey conducted by the Economist Financial Report (beginning only
in 1981) shows the forecasted depreciation of the dollar rising to 10.02
per annum in 1984. A third survey, by Money Market Services, Inc.,
(beginning in 1983) shows three—month ahead forecasts of dollar depreci-
ations rising to 7 .26 percent (per annum) in 1984 It seems unlikely
that investors based their portfolio decisions on the full magnitude of the
expectation depreciation numbers reported in the surveys; since the expec-
ted depreciation numbers were considerably in excess of the interest
differential, there would not be much incentive for investors to hold
dollar assets •Itis likely that investors at each point assigned a signi-
ficant probability to the possibility that the forecasted fall in the
dollar would not materialize in the coming year, as was reasonable given
that such forecasts had turned out wrong for four years. In that case the
rising interest differential could have been an adequate offset for expec-
ted depreciation, providing adequate incentive for investors to continue to
increase their holdings of dollar securities in the 1981—84 period.
Given our argument that investors expect deviations from long—run
equilibrium such as the 1984 overvaluation of the dollar to be corrected,
investors' expectations of future depreciation should have diminished after
March 1985 when the dollar depreciation finally took place. In other
words, if one thinks, as of the end of 1986, that much of the return to
equilibrium has already taken place, then one should think that less
depreciation remains to be accomplished in the future. The survey data
conf inn this, as can be seen by the dashed line in figure 3c. For example,
the Economist survey showed an expected one—year depreciation of the dollar
against the mark of only 4.9 percent as of October 30. 1986, as compared to—36—
9.3 percent on September 5, 1985, just before the Plaza Accord (or 10.7
percent on average between June 1981 and December 1985) .The1985—86
decline in the expected rate of future depreciation explains how foreign
residents would have wished to continue increasing their holdings of dollar
assets despite the decline in the nominal interest differential shown in
Figure 4a.
A useful alternative way to measure the expected rates of return on
different countries assets is to look at the differential in real interest
rates, that is, nominal interest rates adjusted for expected inflation.48
There is no unique way of measuring expected inflation, but the problem is
not as difficult as measuring expected exchange rate changes. Alternative
possible measures of expected inflation tend to give similar answers.
During the late 1970s, and through 1980, the U.S. real interest rate
by the available measures was usually below foreign real interest rates.
As Figure 3a shows, the real interest differential increased in the early
1980s even more steadily than did the nominal interest differential, and
peaked in June 1984. Depending on whether expected inflation is measured
by a three—year distributed lag on actual inflation, the three—year fore-
cast of Data Resources, Inc., or the two—year forecast of the OECD Economic
Outlook, the average long—term real interest differential rose between
1979—80 and 1983—84 by 4.79 percentage points, 3.88 percentage points, or
3 .54 percentage points Thisincrease in return differentials was a
significant inducement to demand for U.S. assets.
3 •U.S.vs.foreign returns on equity
lbcompare countries' rates of return on real capital we can look at
the earnings—to—price ratio or dividend—to—price ratio on equity. These—37—
numbers are already expressed as real rates of return and need not be
corrected for inflation. They are reported for stock markets in hirope,
the Far East and Australia, in addition to the United States, by Capital
International Perspective of Geneva.51
The difference in the rate of return on equity between the United
States and abroad is shown in Figure 5. Like the real interest differ-
entials, the measures of return on equity show a substantial increase from
1980 to 1984, with a dip in between at 1983. The difference in dividend
yields rose from 1.1 in 198052 to 2.3 at the first peak in mid—1982, and
2.1 at the second peak in early 1984. The difference in earnings/price
ratios followed a similar pattern, but with larger swings, rising from 1 .6
on average in 1980 to 5.6 at the first peak in early 1982, and 3.9 in mid—
1984. Both the dividend yield and the earnings/price ratio show the dif-
ferential between the United States and foreign equity markets declining in
1985 and 1986. As of 1987, the rate of return on U.S. equities was still
perceived as high, particularly relative to Japanese equities, attracting
new foreign money into the U.S. stock market. The same could have been
said for U.S. real estate.
To summarize the results on various assets, they generally show that
the low or negative differentials in the rates of return between the United
States and other countries in the late 1970s, turned to substantial posi-
tive differentials in the early 1980s. Since the dollar was weak in the
late 1970s and strong in the early 1980s, the evidence supports the argu-
ment that the change in return differentials induced a shift in investor
preferences, away from foreign assets and toward U.S. assets. One dent in
the simplicity of this story is the dip in return differentials from mid—15.3-
13.3-
5.0-
Figure 4: Returns on Equity
U.S. vs. Rest of World (Europe, Far East, and Australia)
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1985—38—
1982 to 1983, while thedollarwas still appreciating. Some argue that
this may have been due to safe—haven effects associated with the debt
crisis. The other problem of timing is that the second peak in return
differentials occurred nine months before the dollar peaked in March
1985. It is possible that a "speculative bubble" was driving the dollar
during that short period, with investors increasing their demand for
dollars due to short—term expectations of continued appreciation formed by
extrapolating past trends.53 &st the subsequent 1985—1986 decline in the
value of the dollar, simultaneous with continued declines in all of the
measures of return differentials, supports the causal relationship between
the two.
VI. Saving, Investment,and U .S •Macroeconomiciblicies
If rates of return have been the driving force behind international
capital flows and the exchange rate, what is the driving force behind rates
of return?
Interest rates and securities prices are determined by many factors.
Particularly on a daily or monthly basis, corresponding fluctuations in the
market—clearing price will result from whatever unpredictable fluctuations
in demand for an asset occur. Interest rate volatility has been even higher
in the l9BOs than previously. This is partly the result of deregulation
and innovation in world financial markets. However, the dominant source of
the longer—term swings in the real rates of return discussed in the pre-
ceding section appears to be domestic: U.S. macroeconomic policies. So
far in the 1980s, international capital markets have worked to dampen—39—
swings in u.s. rates of return, rather than working as a source of dis-
turbances. Thit in the future, U.S. interest rates willincreasingly be
determined at the mercy of foreign investors.
I. Itnetary policy
In the latter half of the 1970s, expansionarymonetary policy on the
part of the Federal Reserve Board drove down U.S. real interest rates.
That is, even though nominal interest rates were at high levelsby his-
torical standards, the expected inflation rate was alsovery high, so that
the difference of the two was low, even negative. lbward the end ofthe
decade public concern shifted toward the inflation problem, andaway from
employment and growth which had turned out to be surprisingly steady. The
Fed tried to brake the rapid rate of money growth, particularly after
Paul Volcker was appointed thairman, but with no success at first. Hone—
tarist economists charged that the problem was the Fed'suse of the nominal
interest rate as an intermediate target, as opposed to thesupply of bank
reserves or the monetary base, which was argued to be evidence of a lack of
true commitment to the yearly announced target for growth in theaggregate
money supply (Ml) .ByOctober 1979 Volcker had decided that interest rates
would have to be allowed to rise much more sharply ifmoney growth and the
inflation rate were to be reduced. } went along with the monetariststo
the extent of announcing that the Fed would no longertarget the interest
rate on federal funds, even on a short—ten basis, but would insteadtarget
reserves. This was a convenient way of tightening monetary policy without
taking the political heat for higher interest rates. Interest rates have
been significantly more volatile ever since (though the variousmeasures of
the money supply have also been more variable than before)—40—
With a small lag, the new policy produced the anticipated reductionn
in demand for goods when interest rates shot up, particularly after credit
controls were imposed in March 1980. After the brief 1980 recession had
passed, monetary policy was tightened anew, and interest rates climbed
further. The period of dollar appreciation dates from this time. The
second, more serious, recession began in mid—1981. A major consequence of
the higher degree of international capital mobility in the 1980s compared
to earlier decades is that changes in monetary policy operate strongly
through the exchange rate and foreign demand for U.S. products, rather than
solely through the interest rate and domestic demand.
Although nominal interest tates had reached a plateau, and even
dropped discretely in August 1982 when the Federal Reserve responded to the
Mexican debt crisis and general macroeconomic conditions by increasing
money growth, inflation was coming down. Thus, long—term real interest
rates continued their general upward trend through mid—1984, with the
further consequences for the behavior of international investors and the
appreciation of the dollar that we have seen.
Money growth by the conventional measures has been relatively rapid
ever since the recession; Ml grew 10 3 percent per year from 1982 It to
1986 u.54 For the first four years after the acceleration began, the
monetarists warned that inflation would resurge with the customary 6 to 18
month lag. Voicker publicly justified exceeding the yearly money targets
by pointing to exogenous shifts in velocity (defined as the relationship
between the money supply and dollar GNP). The exogenous shifts were at
first identified as the special factors of maturing "All—Savers'
certificates" and the nationwide legalizing of interest on checking—41—
accounts, then more generally as the environment of deregulation and
innovation in the banking industry. An equally important reason for
allowing faster growth in the money numbers was the endogenous shift in
velocity that occurs when people wish to hold more money because expected
inflation and nominal interest rates have fallen.
In the event, Volcker was right and the monetarists were wrong.
Inflation did not reignite during this period. Even with the recovery of
real economic activity that began in 1983 I, which proceeded rapidly until
mid—1984 and then continued at a considerably slower pace through 1986,
nominal GNP grew more slowly than the money supply: 8.0 percent per year
from 1982 II to 1986 Thus velocity grew at 2.3 (=10.3—8.0)
percent per year, in contrast to its past historical pattern of declining
roughly 3 percent per year. If the Federal Reserve had followed the
explicit monetarist prescription of rigidly precotmuitting to a money growth
rate lower than that of the preceding period, say 3 percent, and velocity
had followed the same path, then nominal CNP would have risen at only 0.7
per year. This is an upper bound, because with even lower inflation than
occurred, velocity would almost certainly have fallen even more than it
did. The implication seems clear that the 1981—82 recession would have
lasted another four years.
2.(brporate taxpolicy and investment
Ifthe velocity—adjusted growth rate of money was not unreasonably
high after 1982, neither wasitlow. Howdowe explain the fact that the
long—termreal interest rate in mid—1984 was as high as or higher than it
was in mid—1982? Or that even in late 1986 it was still higher than in
1980?—42—
Thinkof thereal interest rate being determined so that the funds
needed for investment do not exceed the funds available from saving, the
investment rate depending negatively on the real interest rate, and the
national saving rate also depending (presumably positively) on the real
interest rate.56 (Investment is defined as additions to business plant and
equipment, the residential housing stock, and inventories. National saving
is defined as private saving plus public saving.) Then the increase in
real interest rates could be due either to an upward shift in investment, a
downward shift in national saving, or some combination of the two.57 We
consider first investment.
The productivity slowdown of the 1970s convinced many that enhanced
incentives to capital formation were called for, and Ronald Reagan was
elected in 1980 in part on that platform.58 The 1981 tax bill granted
liberalized depreciation allowances (ACRS: the accelerated cost recovery
system) and a liberalized investment tax credit. When investment grew
rapidly in 1983—84, some claimed that the tax incentives, together with the
more generalpro—business climate (a "golden age of capitalism"), was
responsible,andthat the demand for funds to finance the investment boom
in turn explained the increase in real interest rates and the net capital
inflow. The argument seemed to fit in well with the safe—haven explanation
for the strength of the dollar. The main problem with it is that the
investment rate always rises in expansions, and the increase in the 1983—84
recovery was no greater than the decrease in the 1981—82recession.59 By
1985the investment rate hadmerely reattained the approximate level of the
1970s, as Thble 12 shows.6° A second argument is that calculationsof the
benefitsof the tax incentives suggest that (1) they were smaller than theTable 12
U.S. Net Saving and Investment as Percentages of GNP, 1951-85
1951—601961—70 1971—80 1981
Total net saving 6.9% 7.5% 6.1% 5.2%
Net private saving 7.2 8.0 7.1 6.1
Personal saving 4.7 4.7 4.9 4.6
Corporate saving 2.5 3.3 2.2 1.4
State-local government surplus—0.2 0.1 0.9 1.3
Federal government surplus -0.2 —0.5 -1.9 -2.2
Total net investment 7.0 7.5 6.3 5.4
Net private domestic investment 6.7 7.0 6.2 5.2
Plant and equipment 2.7 3.5 3.0 3.1
Residential construction 3.2 2.5 2.5 1.3
Inventory accumulation 0.8 1.1 0.7 0.9
Net foreign investment 0.3 0.5 0.1 0.2
Memoranda: Capital consumption 8.9 8.5 9.9 11.2
Gross private saving16.1 16.4 17.0 17.2
5Table 12 continued
U.S. Net Saving and Investment as Percentages of GNP, 1951-85
1982 1983 1984 1985
Total net saving 1.6% 1.8% 4.1% 3.0%
Net private saving 5.4 5.9 7.4 6.5
Personal saving 4.4 3.6 4.3 3.3
Corporate saving 1.0 2.3 3.1 3.2
State-local government surplus 1.1 1.3 1.4 1.4
Federal government surplus -4.8 -5.4 -4.8 -4.9
Total net investment 1.6 1.8 3.8 2.8
Net private domestic investment 1.6 2.9 6.4 5.7
Plant and equipment 2.0 1.5 4.8 4.9
Residential construction 0.6 1.8
Inventory accumulation —0.9 -0.4 1.6 0.8
Net foreign investment —0.2 -1.0 —2.6 -2.9
Memoranda: Capital consumption 11.7 11.4 11.0 11.0
Gross private saving 17.1 17.3 18.4 17.6
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Survey of Current Business
(various issue), and author's estimate.
Notes: Data are averages (except for 1981—85) of annual flows. Date
for 1985 are through 1985:Q2 at seasonally adjusted annual rates.
• Total netsaving and total net nvestment differ by statistical
discrepancy. Detail may no add to totals because of rounding—43—
increase in real interest rates, so that the after—tax real cost of capital
to firms was not reduced, and that (2) the investment boom was concentrated
in sectors like office computers, where the tax incentives were notvery
relevant and a technological explanation seems to fit instead.6'
Ironically, the Treasury tax reform plan of December 1984, and the
revised tax reform plan actually passed by thngress and signed by the
President in 1986, sharply raised corporate taxes. The logic was that
raising corporate tax revenue was the only way to change personal income
tax brackets and deductions in such a way as to leave a majority of
taxpayers feeling that they were better off, and simultaneously maintain
overall "revenue—neutrality ."Bat the effect was to undo the incentives to
investment enacted in 1981.
3.hdget deficit
Having found that there has been no increase in the investment rate,
relative to the l970s, to explain by itself the high level of real interest
rates and the high capital inf low in the mid—1980s, we now turn to national
saving. We begin with the "dissaving" of the government, that is, the
budget deficit.
The federal budget has not been in surplus since 1969. In the 1975
recession the budget deficit reached the then all—time record high of $69
billion. Steady growth in national income over the next fouryears raised
tax revenues, and reduced the deficit to $16 billion by 1979. However,
this was still considered too high.
The improbable "Laffer O.xrve Theory," which held that a reduction in
personal income tax rates would stimulate production and income so much as—44—
to raise total tax revenues rather than lowerthem, helped to convince
politicians to enact large tax cuts in 1981, to be installedover three
years. At the same time, some categories of domestic spending werecut
sharply, but they were a relatively small part of the total. Giventhe
enormous buildup in military expenditure, the exemption of socialsecurity
benefits from cuts, the runaway increases insome other categories like
farm support, and the exogenous fact ofenormous interest payments on the
national debt, it was inevitable that the federalbudget deficit would soar
to unprecedented levels. Initially it was possible to blame theincreased
budget deficit on the reduced tax revenues from the 1981—82recession, It
was claimed that rapid growth in income and therefore in taxrevenues would
return the budget to balance in a few years•bitthe tax rate cuts and
spending increases were phased in as quickly as incomegrew. The deficit
reached $208 billion in l983—more than three times the"intolerably high"
levels of the late 1970s—and remained in thevicinity of $200 billion for
the following four years. The increase in the federaldeficit relative to
the 1970s was 3 .0 percent of CM', as Table 12 shows.
State and local governments in theaggregate improved their surplus by
about $30 billion between 1980 and 1985,62or by 0.5 percent of CM'
relative to the 1970s, as ble 12 shows. Thus thedecline in the general
government budget balance was not quite as bad as the decline in the
federal budget balance.
4.Private saving
Thble 13 reports the total gross nationalsaving rate, including both















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































figure for the United States in 1984 was 17.0 percent, and the average for
the others was 23.1 percent. Even aside from public dissaving in the form
of government budget deficits, there are disparities in private saving
between the United States and other countries. The U.S. household saving
rate, at Sd percent of disposable income in 1985, is extremely low by
international standards. The United Kingdom's is 11.9, West Germany's
13.0, and Japan's 22.5.63 Japan's especially high rate of household saving
has been attributed to, among other things, a pro—saving tax and financial
system, a shortage of housing, leisure, and consumption goods on which to
spend income, and a demographic bulge in the generation of Japanese who
will be retiring over the next 20 years.
According to some theories, an increase in the U.S. budget deficit
such as has occurred in the 1980s should produce an increase in private
saving to offset it. The theoretical argument is that households will
think ahead to the day when the government has to raise taxes to pay off
the debt, and that they will increase their saving today so that they or
their children will have the resources to pay those taxes. The original
supply—siders in the Administration relied less on that theoretical argu-
ment than on the argument that households would respond to a higher after—
tax rate of return by saving more. In any case, the predicted increase in
thepersonal saving rate did not materialize. The personal saving rate, as
apercentage of disposable personal income, fell from 7.1 percent in 1980
to 5.1 percent in 1985. Corporate saving rose, on the other hand, by 1
percent of GNP in 1985 relative to the 1970s. When personal and corporate
saving are added together, total private saving as a share of GNP in 1985
was approximatelythe same as it was on average in the 1970s.—46—
Thus, there was no upsurge in private saving to offset the increase in
the budget deficit. This means that there was less national saving left
over to finance investment.
5•Therelationship betweennational saving and investwent
In a closed economy, that is, one cut off from the rest of the world,
the fall in national saving would have driven up the cost of capital how-
ever much necessary to reduce the level of investment to the level of do-
mestic funds available to finance it.64 As it was, the cost of capital did
rise in the 1980s, whether measured as the real interest rate or the return
on equity, as we saw in the previous section. bit because the increase in
interest rates attracted a large capital inflow ("net foreign investment,"
In 1ble 9), investment in plant and equipment was not crowded out as much
as it otherwise would have been. The net capital inflow is precisely the
current account deficit, which has generated so much concern, viewed from
its more flattering profile. That a decline in national saving must either
be offset by a net capital inflow or else reflected as a decline in
investment, is a very general proposition; the natural mechanism is the
increase in real interest rates, but the proposition must hold, no matter
what happens to financial market prices.
An interesting question is how changes in national savings have been
divided between changes in capital flow and changes in investment in prior
historical episodes. Figure 5 shows U.S. national saving, investment and
the current account surplus (capital. outflow) over the last three decades,
each as shares of GNP. The saving rate and investment rate ve closely
together; the difference between the two, the current account, movesU.S. National Saving (NS), Investment (I), and Current Account
(CA) as Sbarcs of GNP, 1955—84
Sources: Roger Ransom and Richard Stuck, "Domestic Saving as an Active Constraint on
Capital Fonnation n the American Economy,1839-1928:A Provisional Theory." University of
California Projea on the History of Saving, Working Papano.1. University of California-
Berkeley, 1983,Tables4 and £1; and U.S. Depamnent of Commerce, HÜSOi*JIStatistics of
theU.S.
Figure 6 U.S. National Saving (Private Saving plusGovernmentBudget
Surplus)(NS), Investment(I), and Current Account (CA) as
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1 1170-flTable 14 Gross fixed capital formation as percentage of (DP (Part 1 of5)
1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974
United States 18.7 18.517.9 18.1 18.2 17.6 18.1 18.7 19.1618.4
Japan 29.8 30.4 32.0 33.2 34.4 35.5 34.2 34.1 36.4 34.8
Germany 26.125.4 23.1 22.4 23.3 25.5 26.1 25.4 23.9 21.6
France 23.3 23.7 23.8 23.3 23.4 23.4 23.6 23.7 23.8 24.3
United Xingdan 18.518.5 19.1 19.4 18.9 19.0 18.9 18.7 20.0 20.9
Italy 19.3 18.8 19.5 20.3 21.0 21.4 20.4 19.8 20.8 22.4
Canada 23.5 24.5 23.2 21.5 21.4 20.8 21.8 21.7 22.4 23.0
Total of above
ccxmtrjes 20.9 20.8 20.5 20.7 21.1 21.3 21.6 22.1 23.0 22.4
Austria 27.3 27.8 26.6 25.7 25.1 25.9 27.9 30.2 28.5 28.4
Belgium 22.4 22.9 22.9 21.5 21.3 22.7 22.1 21.3 21.4 22.7
nmark 24.1 24.1 24.2 23.4 24.6 24.7 24.2 24.6 24.8 24.0
Finland 26.326.5 25.1 23.1 23.8 26.3 27.5 27.9 28.8 29.8
Greece 21.6 21.7 20.3 23.2 24.6 23.6 25.2 27.8 28.0 22.2
Iceland 27.228.5 32.1 32.7 25.7 25.0 30.7 29.2 31.6 33.9
Ireland 21.419.8 20.1 20.9 23.3 22.7 23.6 23.7 25.3 24.6
Luxetourg 28.026.6 23.9 22.1 22.2 23.1 28.4 27.8 27.3 24.5
Netherlands 25.2 26.3 26.4 26.9 24.6 25.9 25.4 23.6 23.1 21.9
Norway 28.228.7 29.7 26.9 24.3 26.5 29.7 27.7 29.3 30.5Table 14 Gross fixei capital fomatiai as percentage of —-(Part2 of 5)
1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974
portugal 22.8 25.1 26.6 22.2 22.6 23.2 24.7 27.1 26.8 26.0
Spain 21.7 22.0 22.3 22.8 23.2 23.2 21.2 22.2 23.6 24.7
Sweden 24.7 24.8 24.8 23.9 23.2 22.5 22.0 22.2 21.9 21.5
Switzerland 28.7 27.4 26.0 25.6 25.8 27.5 29.2 29.7 29.4 27.6
Turkey 14.615.9 16.4 17.3 17.4 18.6 17.0 20.2 20.1 18.6
Total snaller
airopean caintries 24.0 24.3 24.1 23.7 23.4 24.1 24.2 24.5 24.7 24.3
Australia 27.7 27.3 26.5 26.9 26.7 26.5 26.9 25.2 24.4 23.8
Nay Zealand 21.921.9 20.3 18.5 19.6 20.8 20.7 22.5 22.7 25.9
Totalwailer
caintries 24.4 24.6 24.3 24.0 23.7 24.3 24.5 24.5 24.6 24.3






the united States23.924.024.024.124.525.325.325.326.025.5Table 14 Gross saving as percentage of G)P (Part 3 of 5)
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984
Unitad States 17.0 17.1 18.3 19.5 19.8 18.5 17.6 16.5 16.8 17.9
Japan 32.5 31.2 30.2 30.4 31.7 31.6 30.7 29.7 28.3 27.8
Germany 20.4 20.1 20.2 20.7 21.8 22.7 21.8 20.5 20.6 20.3
France 23.3 23.3 22.3 21.4 21.5 21.9 21.4 20.8 19.8 18.9
Unit Kingdan 19.9 19.4 18.6 18.5 18.8 18.1 16.4 16.4 16.4 17.4
Italy 20.6 20.0 19.6 18.7 18.8 19.8 20.2 19.0 17.9 18.2
Canada 24.023.1 22.7 22.2 22.6 22.8 23.5 21.5 19.2 18.1
Totalofabove
countries 21.020.8 21.2 21.9 22.3 21.8 21.1 19.9 19.5 19.9
Austria 26.7 26.0 26.7 25.6 25.1 25.5 25.2 23.0 22.2 21.8
Belgiun 22.522.1 21.7 21.7 20.8 21.2 18.1 17.4 16.4 16.1
Denmark 21.1 23.0 22.1 21.7 20.9 18.8 15.6 16.1 15.9 17.3
Finland 31.327.9 27.0 24.0 23.2 25.3 25.0 24.9 25.1 23.4
Greece 20.8 21.2 23.0 23.9 25.8 24.2 22.3 20.2 20.3 18.6
Iceland 33.228.7 27.8 24.6 23.7 25.3 24.6 25.1 22.5 22.2
Ireland 22.725.0 24.8 27.7 30.5 28.6 29.1 25.9 22.7 21.0
Laixanbwrg 27.824.9 25.1 24.1 24.3 27.0 25.4 25.9 23.7 22.2
Netherlands 21.1 19.4 21.1 21.3 21.0 21.0 19.2 18.2 18.1 18.4
Norway 34.236.3 37.1 31.8 27.7 24.8 28.0 25.5 24.8 25.6Table 14 Gross saving as percentage of G)P (Part 4 of 5)
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984
Por-bgal 25.9 25.1 26.5 27.9 26.6 28.6 32.2 32.3 30.3 24.7
Spain 23.3 21.8 21.0 19.9 18.9 19.4 20.3 19.7 18.8 17.8
Sw3en 20.9 21.2 21.1 19.4 19.6 20.2 19.2 16.8 18.7 18.4
Switzerland 24.0 20.6 20.7 21.4 21.8 23.8 24.1 23.1 23.3 23.3
Turkey 20.823.1 24.4 21.9 20.8 19.9 19.3 19.1 18.9 18.5
Total snaller
European countries 23.5 22.9 23.1 22.2 21.6 21.8 21.4 20.6 20.2 19.7
Australia 24.224.1 23.8 23.8 23.1 23.9 25.6 24.8 22.3 21.8
NewZealand 27.024.8 22.4 20.6 18.2 18.2 21.2 23.0 22.7 21.5
Total snaller
countries 23.6 23.1 23.2 22.4 21.7 22.0 21.9 21.2 20.5 20.1






the United States24.223.823.523.423.523.623.422.421.721.6Table 14 Gross saving as percentage ofG)P (Part 5 of 5)
SQirce:National Accwnts (annual OECD piblicat ion). The data In this table are
neasured according to the standard definitions of the O-tJnita3 Nations
systwi of accaints. (See A Systan of National Acaints, Series F, No. 2, Rev.
3. UnitedNations, 1968.)
Percentages for intry grwçs. The percentages for each grwp ofcountriesare
calculated frait thetotal (P and gross fixedcapital formation forthegroup,
withtoth aggregates expressed in US don ars at current exchange rates.
Wait OECD Econaitic Oitlook, May 1986, p. 176
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less. That is, before the l980s, foreign capital usually played a small
role in financing U.S. investment.
ftit it would be wrong to conclude from this correlation alone that a
change in national saving resulting from an exogenous change in fiscal
policy is necessarily reflected in investment rather than in the current
account. The close correlation between saving and investment rates in
Figure 5 could result from the effect of a third factor on both, rather
than a causal relationship between the two. The business cycle is the most
obvious third factor; saving rates and investment rates are both known to
rise in booms and fall in recessions.
There are several ways of attempting to address this problem. One
would be to adjust saving and investment cyclically, or to use more sophis-
ticated econometric techniques. A second is to look at saving and invest-
ment rates across countries rather than over time. Table 14 gives the
investment rates for 24 countries to match the national saving rates in
Table 13. It is clear that a country like the United States—or Belgium,
Denmark and Sweden——that has a low rate of national saving, also tends to
have a low rate of investment; the countries like Japan——or Finland, Norway
and Switzerland—that have high saving rates tend to have high investment
rates.
A third way to get around the problem of cyclical variation in saving
and investmentis to average yearly observations over somewhat longer time
intervals to take out some of the cyclical effect. Figure 6 shows decade
averagesof saving, investment and the current account from the 1870s to
the 1970s. The saving and investment rates are still highly correlated.
The only time when the two diverged as widely as they have in the mid—1980s—48—
was the 1910s •UnitedStates investment had fallen slightly below national
saving, that is, the country had begun to run current account surpluses, in
the 1890s. Sit this capital outflow reached its highest during World
War I ,asthe United States was lending to finance dissaving in Ehrope.
Subsequent divergences between saving and investment were much smaller.
The experience of the 1980s stands out among industrialized countries,
even if we look only at the absolute magnitude of the net capital flow (as
opposed to the direction) .TheUnited States and other economies, which
erected barriers to trade and capital flows in the 1930s and 1940s, have
become more integrated since. The increasing degree of integration of
financial markets in the 1970s and 1980s allows countries to have different
saving rates without the differences in investment rates having to be as
large; international capital flows make up the difference.
6. The UnitedStates asa net debtor
TheU.S.current account at present stands out, even more than by
virtue of its absolute magnitude, because a wealthy country is running
persistent deficits. Through most of the 20th century the United States
has run current account surpluses, as we have seen. Even in the 1970s,
when the two oil shocks raised import spending, the current accountwas on
average equal to zero.
As the direct implication of the current account surpluses from the
1980s to the 1960s, the United States was accumulating net claimson
foreigners. During World War I the country passed from being a net debtor
vis—a—vis the rest of the world, to being a net creditor, by 1981 the
United States had attained a recorded net investmentposition of $140.7—49—
billion (with 37 percent of the private assets consisting of direct
investment and 47 percent consisting of bank—reported claims) •65
Net interest and other income on this investment position earned $34.1
billion in 1981, more than enough to pay for the deficit in merchandise
trade and leave a surplus in goods and services or in the overall current
account. hit the current account went into deficit in 1982, as we have
seen, as a result of the pattern of high U.S. real interest rates, capital
inflow from abroad, strong dollar, and U.S. trade deficit. The situation
deteriorated rapidly. '1985the current account deficit reached $117.7
billion. (Despite the depreciation of the dollar that began in March 1985,
the current account deficit in 1986 was in the neighborhood of $135
billion.) It took only three years of current account deficit to undo a
century of accumulation of foreign assets. Sometime in early 198566 the
country on the books returned to net—debtor from net—creditor status, as
Table 15 shows. 'theend of 1986 the U.S. recorded position was
approximately —$225 billion, a debt far higher than the creditor position
was at its peak. Even if the depreciated dollar leads to an improved trade
balance in 1987, as it is expected to in line with the customary lags, the
United States will probably continue to run substantial trade deficits for
quite a few years, and the net debt will continue to mount rapidly.
Even if the 1985—86 depreciation of the dollar soon reduces the trade
deficit to a plateau of $100 billion, the net debt position would reach the
vicinity of $600 billion by the end of 1989. Simply multiplying by an
interest rate would suggest that the annual cost of interest and dividends
to investors in other countries would then run on the order of $40 to $50
billion. In other words, to eliminate the overall current account deficitTable 15
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(Millions of dollars)
thes InitionIn1985 (decrease (—))
Attrikitableto:
Posi-Capital Price&- Other Thtal Position
tion flowschanges change'changes2 (a÷b+ 1985w
1984r(a) (b) rate (c) (d) cid)
Line Trpe of Invesbmnt changes
1 Netinternational investirent position of the 4,384 —94,670—24,3357,007 174—111,824 —107,440
United States(line 2 less line20)
2 U.S. assets abroad 898,18732,43611,9918,540 1,212 54,180952,367
3 U.S. official reserve assets 34,187 3,436 4,400 —6 8,252 43,185
4 Gold 11,096 —6 —6 11,090
5 Special drawing rights 5,641 897 755 1,652 7,293
6 Reserve position in theInternational 11,541 —908 1,314 406 11,947
itnetary E\ind
7 Foreign currencies 6.656 3,869 2,331 6,200 12,856
8 U.S. Gverutnt assets, otker than 84,636 2,824 —42 2,782 87,418
official reserve assets
9 U.S.loans and other long—teim assets4 82,657 2,935 —7 2 2,93085,587
10 Repayable in dollars 80,487 2,961 1 2 2,964 83,811
11 Other5 1,810 —26 —8 —34 1,776
12 U.S. foreigncurrency holdings and 1,979 —11.1 —35 —2 —148 1,831
U.S.short-ternassets
13 U.S. private assets 778,61825,75411,9914,182 1,21843,146821,764
14 Direct investhEntabroad 212,99418,752 921 19,673232,667
15 Foreign securities 89,9977,97711,9914,182 24,150114,147
16 Bonds 62,0714,0185,6881,648 11,35473,425
17 Corporate stocks 27,9263,9596,3032,534 12,79640,722
18 U.S. claizrs on unaffiliated foreigners 29,996—1,665 —111 —1,77628,220
reportedby U.S. nonbanking concerns
19 U.S. clams reported by U.S. baths, 445,631 691 408 1,099 446,730
not included elsewhereTable 15 (continued, left side, page 2)
InternationalInvesthent Position ofthe UnitedStates atYearenI, 1984 and 1985
(Millions of dollars)
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Posi— Capital Price Thc— Other TotalPosition
tion flows changeschange1 ciianges2(a+b+ 1985P
1984r(a) (b)rate (c) (d) c+d)
20 Foreign assets in the United States 893,803121,10636,326 1,533 1,038166,0041,059,507
21 Foreign officialassetsin the U.S. 199,127—1,324 4,507 —2 3,181 202,308
22 U.S. Goverrnent securities 143,014 —841 1,563 722 143,736
23 U.S. Treasury securities 135,510 —546 1,072 526 136,036
24 Other - 7,504 —295 491 196 7,700
25 Other U.S. GoverrlTnt liabilities9 14,798 483 —1 482 15,280
26 U.S. liabilities reported by U.S. banks, 26,090 522 —1 521 26,611
27 Other foreign official assets 15,225—1,488 2,944 1,456 16,681
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30 U.S. Treasury securities 58,33020,5005,X2 25,502 83,832
31 U.S. securities other than U.S. 128,56050,85926,817 1,533 79,210207,770
Treasury securities
32 Corporate and other thnds 32,72446,0%1,569 1,533 49,107 81,531
33 Corporate stocks 95,836 4,85525,248 30,103 125,939
34 U.S. liabilities to *maffiliated 31,024—1,172 —750 —1,922 29,102
foreigners reported byU.S.
nonbanking concerns
35 U.S. liabilities reported by U.S. banks, 312,11940,387 1,278 41,665 353,844Table 15(continued,center, page 1)
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United States (line 2 less line20)
2U.S. assetsabroad 272,148316,552115,006118,67048,36256,288
3 U.S. official reserve assets 4,119 8,491 (*) (*)2,0374,365
4 Gold
5 Special drawing rights
6 Reserve position in tie International
— F\md
7 Foreign currencies 4,119 8,491 (*) (*) 2,037 4,365
8 U.S. Governmnt assets, other than 10,511 10,179 709 619 443 361
official reserveassets
9 U.S. loans andotter long—term assets4 10,41910,036 676 589 425 339
10 Repayable in dollars 10,172 9,815 676 589 425 339
11 Other5 247 221
12 U.S. foreign currency holdings and 92 143
U.S. short-term assets
13 U.S. private assets 257,518297,282
14 Direct investznt abroad 92,017106,762
15 Foreign securities 31,414 50,063
16 Bonds 19,667 29,748
17 Corporate stocks 11,747 20,315
18 U.S. damE on unaffiliated foreigners 9,479 9,796
reported by U.S. nonbanking concerns
19 U.S. claizrs reported by U.S. banks, 124,608131,26121,64720,38132,91035,593
not included elsewhere
























1,491Table 15 (continued, center, page 2)
International Investient Position of the United States at Yearend, 1984 and 1985
(Millions of dollars)
Positionby area
Western &arcçe Canada Japan
Line Type of Irwestntnt 1964 1985 1984 1965 1984 1965
20Foreign assets in the United States 422,670 515,03258,48565,744 101,819 188,729
21 Foreignofficialassetsinthe U.S. 72,32277,8621,686 1,473 (8) (8)
22 U.S. Governrentsecurities (7) (7) (7) (7) (6) (8)
23 U.S. Treasury securities (7) (7) (7) (7) (6) (8)
24 Other (7) (7) (7) (7) (8) (8)
25 Other U.S. Goverrment liabilities9 2,684 3,098 157 156 1,564 1,361
26 U.S. liabilities reported by U.S. banks, (7) (7) (7) (7) (8) (8)
27 Other foreign official assets (7) (7) (7) (7) (8) (8)
28 Otherforeign assets in the United States 350,348 437,17056,80964,271 (8) (8)
29 Direct investsiEntin the United States 108,211120,90615,28616,67816,04419,116
3D U.S. Treasurysecurities (7) (7) (7) (7) (8) (8)
31 U.S. securities other than U.S. 89,519150,11719,71825,3174,19310,542
Treasurysecurities
32 thrporate and otherbonds 25,58567,4531,2901,5792,9108,628
33 Corporatestocks 63,934 82,66418,42823,738 1,283 1,914
34 U.S. liabilities to unaffiliate.d 11,412 11,986 3,022 2,388 2,475 2,969
foreigners reported by U.S.
nonbankirig concerns
35 U.S. liabilities reported by U.S. banks, (7) (7) (7) (7) (8) (8)
not included elsewhereTable 15 (rightside, pe 1)









Line Type ofinvestirent 1984 1985 1984 1985
1 Netinternationalixivestxinntposition of the78,311 54,048 39,350 29,597
UnitedStates(line 2 less line20)
2U.S. assetsabroad 267,040266,102195,630194,755
3 U.S. official reserve assets 500 28,27730,330
4 Gold 11,0% 11,090
5 Specialdrawing rights 5,641 7,293
6 Reserveposition in the International 11,541 11,947
t'bnetary Find
7 Foreigncurrencies 500
8 U.S.Govenxntassets, other than 15,510 16,535 57,462 59,723
official reserve assets
9 U.S. loansand other long—ten assets4 15,154 16,245 55,983 58,377
10 Repayable in dollars 14,730 15,854 54,344 57,213
11 Other5 424 391 1,139 1,164
12 U.S. foreign currency holdings and 356 290 1,479 1,346
U.S. short—tern assets
13 U.S. private assets 251,030249,567109,891 104,702
14 Direct investeent abroad 25,229 29,479640,9956 40,896
15 Foreignsecurities 2,689 2,225 11,724 9,670
16 Bonds 2,087 1,548 9,987 7,300
17 Corporate stocks 602 677 1,737 2,370
18 U.S. clams on imaffiliated foreigners 10,237 9,457 3,578 3,047
reported by 11.5. nonbankirig concerns
19 U.S. clams reported by U.S.banks, 212,875208,406 53,591 51,089Table 15(right side,page 2)









Line Type ofinvestnent 19841985 1984 1985
20Foreignassets in the tin.tted States 188,729212,054156,280165,158
21 Foreignofficial assets in theU.S. 9.35911,781 (8) (8)
22 U.S. Governntsecurities (7) (7) (8) (8)
23 U.S. Treasurysecurities (7) (7) (6) (8)
24 Other (7) (7) (8) (8)
25 OtherU.S. Govennnt liabilities9 908 766 9,487 9,899
26 U.S. liabilities reported by U.S. banks, (7) (7) (8) (8)
27 Otherforeign official assets (7) (7) (8) (8)
28 Other foreign assets inthe UnitedStates 179,370200,273 (8) (8)
29 Direct investhent IntheUnited States 16,201 17,050 8,641 9,201
30 U.S. Treasury securities (7) (7) (8) (8)
31 U.S. securities other than U.S. 8,107 12,314 7,023 9,480
Treasurysecurities
32 Corporate and otherbonds 1,236 1,826 1,103 2,345
33 Corporatestocks 6,671 10,488 5,320 7,135
34 U.S.liabilities to unaffiliated 7,190 4,6% 6,925 7,105
- foreignersreportedbyU.S.
nonbanicingrnns
35 U.S. liabilities reported by U.S. banks, (7) (7) (6) (8)
not Includedelsad,ere?C1 10 TABlE 15
r. Revised.
p. Preliminary. .Lessthan $500,O® (+ or -)
1.Represents gains or losses on foreign currency-denaninated assets due to their revaluation at
current exchange rates.
2. Includes changes in coverage, statistical discrepancies, and other adjusthients to the value of
assets.
3. Reflects U.S. Treasury sales of gold nEdallions and camnitrative awl billion coins; these
daitmetizations are not included in international transactions capital flows.
4. Also includes paid-in capital subecriptions to international financial institutions and
outstanding axounts of miscellaneous claix that have been settled through international
agrerents to be payable to the U.S. Goverrirent over periods in excess of 1 year. Thccludes World
War I debts that are not being serviced.
5. Includes indebtedness that the borrower may contractually, or at its option, repay with its
currency, with a third country's currency, or by delivery of materials or transfer of services.
6. Includes, as part of international and unallocated, the estimated direct investnant in
international shipping ccrrpanies, In operating oil and gas drilling equijrnt that is zawed fran
country to country duri.ng the year, and in petrolein trading ccupanies.
7. Details not slrdQn separately are included in totals in lines 21 awl 28.
8. Details not shown separately are included in line 20.
9. Primarily includes U.S. Govennnt liabilities associated with military sales contracts and
other transactions arranged with or through foreign official agencies.
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in the 19905 would then require not just an elimination of the remaining
$100 billion trade deficit, but a reversal to a trade surplus of $40 to $50
billion in order to earn the money to service the debt that has been
incurred in the meantime.
Calculation of the interest and dividend payments is more complicated
than this, however, because different assets pay different rates of return
and the composition of U.S. overseas assets is different from the compo-
sition of U.S. liabilities. Foreign investments in the United States are
somewhat more concentrated in easury and other bonds (19.3 percent of
privately—held assets) as opposed to direct investment (21 .3 percent) and
bank—reported liabilities (41.3 percent). (brporate stocks are 14.7 per-
cent, and other U.S. liabilities are 3.4 percent.) This is as compared to
U.S. investments abroad which are relatively less concentrated in bonds
(8.9 percent of private assets) and relatively more in direct investment
(28.3 percent) and bank—reported assets (54.4 percent). (rporate stocks
are 5.0 percent, and other U.S. assets are 3.4 percent.) Earnings on
direct investment and bank loans tend to be greater than interest earned on
bonds; as a result, recorded earnings on U.S. assets abroad still exceed
recorded payments on foreign investments in the United States, even a year
after its return to net debtor status. In 1986 (first three quarters), the
recorded return on all U.S. investments abroad ran at an average 9.7 per-
cent, the payment rate on U.S. liabilities at only 6.5 percent. If this
differential holds up. the recorded balance on overseas investment income
will decline more slowly than one would otherwise think. bit an unprece-
dented decline will nevertheless take place. Estimates by the Institute of
International Economics place the likely 1990 investment income balance in—51—
the range of —$15 to —$25 billion (Islam, 1987)
If the funds borrowed from abroad in the 1980s were being used to
finance productive investment in plant and equipment, then the additional
output would be available in future decades to service the debt. Unf or—
tunately, as we have seen, the funds have been going to finance the federal
budget deficit (or, equivalently, to offset crowding out of private invest-
ment) .Asmany less developed debtor countries have discovered over the
last five years, military arias or consumer goods don't generate theforeign
exchange earnings needed to service the debt incurred when they were
purchased.
It must be noted that all of the above figures on the U.S. net indebt-
edness position are subject to more than the usual amount ofmeasurement
error. The two major sources of error go in opposite directions. On the
one hand, if most of the statistical discrepancy in the balance ofpay-
ments, which has run at roughly $25 billion a year from 1979 to 1986, is
unreported capital inflows, then the true net indebtedness is worse by some
$200 billion.67 On the other hand, some of the foreign assets acquired in
the past, particularly direct investment, have undergone increases in value
that are not reflected in the figures, suggesting that the trueposition
may be better than recorded. It seems likely that the first effect is at
least as important as the second. The Federal Reserve B3ard estimates that
the country may have become a net debtor in 1983 rather than 1985, withnet
indebtedness reaching $235 billion in 1985.68 Inany case, the sheer inag—
nitude of the current account deficits guarantees that the net indebtedness
position is deteriorating very rapidly.—52—
6 •Ornclusion
Massive U.S. borrowing from the rest of the world in the 1980s is the
result of massive borrowing by the U.S. government. By 1980, the U.S.
government had accumulated a debt of $914 billion over two centuries. This
debt precisely doubled by 1985, and is estimated to have reached $2,130
billion by the end of 1986.69 The role of foreigners in financing the U.S.
budget deficit is dramatized by the fact that foreign owership of Treasury
securities is rising rapidly; recorded private holdings stood at $84
billion as of the end of 1985, and official holdings at $136 billion, kit
from an economic viewpoint, it is immaterial whether foreign residents buy
U.S. government debt directly or whether they lend the money to private
U.S. residents who use it to buy government debt.
-
Thebig increase in government borrowing after 1980 was not on the
whole accommodated by monetary policy. While the total federal debt
doubled, the debt held by the Federal Reserve went up by somewhat less and
consequently the debt held by the public went up somewhat more. The
borrowing drove up real interest rates in the United States, attracting
capital inflows from all parts of the world and in all forms. This capital
inflow has been made easier by reduced taxes and controls on international
capital movements and a general trend of liberalization and innovation.
The favorable aspect of the inflow is that by helping to finance the
federal deficit it has kept U.S. real interest rates lower than they would
otherwise be. The unfavorable aspect is that the counterpart to the record
capital account surpluses are the record trade and current account
deficits .o—53—
The widespread feeling is that these imbalances are unsustainable.
The U.S. trade deficit may be politically unsustainable, in the sense that
Ongressmen will be pushed, by those of their constituents that suffer from
the international competition, into enacting protectionist barriers. This
would be very costly both for the country as a whole and for the world
trading system as a whole.
It is also possible that the borrowing from abroad is unsustainable in
the sense that at some point foreigners will tire of accepting ever—larger
quantities of U.S. assets into their portfolios. The consequence then
could be a sharp fall in the value of the dollar combined with a sharp
increase in U.S. interest rates. For the dollar by itself to accomplish
enough trade improvement to return the country to current account equi-
librium, the depreciation would have to be considerably larger than what we
have already seen in 1985 and 1986.
The unpleasant alternative is that the same improvement in the trade
balance would at some point instead be accomplished by a recession,
reducing imports. The large stock of debt that is already outstanding
means that U.S. policy—making will from now on find itself much more
restricted in its ability to respond to adverse developments. cause the
federal deficit is already large despite four years of economic expansion,
the government will not be able to respond to any future recession by
reducing taxes or raising expenditure. Still less will the Federal Reserve
be able to respond to a recession by lowering interest rates, if the source
of the recession is a reduction in the willingness of foreign investors to
keep supplying the United States with capital. Indeed, the outstanding
debt to foreigners means that a likely scenario is the one in which—54—
investors' fears that the U.S. will have difficulty maintaining the futnre
value of those assets win cause the depreciation of the dollar to
accelerate and interest rates to rise. In such a scenario the Federal
Reserve would be reluctant to expand monetary policy because that might
further enhance fears of inflation and dollar depreciation. At that potts
there might be no alternative to a combination of sharply higher interest
rates and recession in order to reduce imports and restore the confidenra
of financial markets. This position, a familiar one to many debtors, wnu]Ld
be a new one for Americans.
As of the beginning of 1987, the financial markets are still absorbuii*g
the imbalances with little difficulty. The decline of the dollar has been
a "soft landing" rather than a "hard landing" in the sense that interest
rates have come down since 1984 rather than gone up. This is probably
because the dollar depreciation has been the result of a combination of
(1) easier monetary policy, (2) perceptions of reduced future budget
deficits under the Gramm—Rudman legislation and (3) a confidence—inspiring
process of consultation and coordination between U.S. and other authori-
ties, most dramatically represented by the September 1985 Plaza Accord.
The federal budget deficit and trade deficit will each probably decline lint
a minor way in 1987 •bitthe policies now in place imply continued massive
federal deficits, and as a result continued capital inflows and trade
deficits, into the indefinite future.—55—
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(which appear with positive signs because they are accounting credits)
2. Under the floating exchange rate system, when investors increase their
demand for dollar assets, this can take the form of an increase in the
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6. See Levich (this volume) for elaboration on such innovations.
7. thoper (1986, p. 10).
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Canada study shows the pound ahead of the mark and yen in bid—ask spreads
for 1973—81; thngworth, &>othe and GLinton (1983, p. 63).
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exist, in the form of either capital controls or the sort of political
risk discussed below. Although there is no sure—fire way of telling
which sort of barrier is operating just by looking at the interest rates,
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40. IMF Annual Report, 1986, Table 1.3,p. 61.
41. Central banks make the decision to trade their own currencies forforeign
reserve currencies on the basis of macroeconomic considerations, hit the
decision how to allocate a given portfolio of foreigncurrency reserves
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destabilizing is due to Bergsten and Williamson (2001)
42. The argument that official reserve transactions should be classified
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not continuing to appreciate as one would expect under the safe—haven
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45. The United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, Canada and Japan. The
interest rates are yields on government bonds, in their own currencies,
with maturities ranging from 10 years or more for Japan and Canada to 20
years for the United States and Canada. The weights are moving averages
of GNP shares. The source is the International Monetary Fund.—61—
46. Morgan Guaranty's index. The weights are based on 1980 U.S. bilateral
trade in manufactures and the price levels are wholesale prices of non—
food manufactures.
47 •Thethree statistics are simple averages of dollar depreciation against
other currencies: the mark, yen, pound, French franc, and Swiss franc in
the case of the American Fcpress and Economist surveys, and the first
four currencies in the case of the Honey Market Services survey. For
further description and analysis of the survey data, see Frankel and
Froot (1986)
48. If arbitrage equates the nominal interest differential to investors'
expected nominal depreciation, then the real interest differential will
equal expected real depreciation.
49. The peak real interest differential by this measure was 4.2 percent. The
expected inflation rates in the figure are calculated by the
International Monetary Fund from distributed lags on actual inflation
rates.
50. The interest rates are on 10—year bonds from Morgan Guaranty. The
trading partners are the United Kingdom, France, Germany and Japan,
weighted by GNP shares. Following the logic of the footnote—before—last,
one might infer from a 1984 10—year real interest differential of 3
percent that investors must have expected the dollar to depreciate in
real terms over the next ten years at an average rate of 3 percent a
year, or approximately 30 percentcumulatively. If 10 years is thought
to be a long enough time to guarantee a return to long—run equilibrium,
this rough calculation suggests that in 1984 the market considered the
dollar to be about 30 percent above its equilibrium. (Note that investors—62—
do not respond directly to real interest differentials, but rather to
nominal interest differentials and expected exchange rate changes;
Frankel, 1986.)
51. Now owned by Morgan Stanley.
52. The average of the four end—of—quarter figures. Frankel (1986,
Table 2—1)
53. Such bandwagon expectations are supported by survey data at horizons of
one week to one month, shorter—term than the survey data shown in
Figure 3c.
54. Economic Indicators, September 1986. The Federal Reserve Bank of St
Louis, September 12, 1986, reports 9.9 percent at a compounded annual
rate of change.
55. Economic Indicators, September 1986.
56. The identity is that investment is equal to national saving plus the net
capital inflow from abroad.
57. In this framework, how would we interpret an increase in real interest
rates caused by a monetary contraction as in 1980—82? One could think of
it as a fall in the private saving rate associated with the recession.
58. Reductions in personal income taxes were more important to the suply—
siders in the Reagan camp than the corporate investment tax incentives.
59. Investment net of depreciation shows more of adeclineafter 1980 than
gross investment because the capital consumption allowance is higher in
the l980s than in the 1970s.
60. Dnworth (1985) .Feldstein(1986) finds no evidence of an effect of
changes in corporate tax rates and investment incentives on interest
rates. He estimates that the increase in projected budget deficits was—63—
responsible for about two—thirds of the rise in interest rates between
1977—78 and 1983—84.
61. It should be noted that an upward shift in firms' desire to invest could
lead to an increase in real interest rates, without an increase in the
quantity of investment actually undertaken, if the sources of saving
available to finance investment were competely unresponsive to interest
rates. hit even if domestic U.S. saving, both private and public, is
indeed unresponsive to interest rates, the available supply of foreign
saving is to the contrary highly responsive to the U.S. interest rate.
Thus the failure of the observed investment rate to rise in the l980s is
valid evidence against the claim that enhanced investment incentives can
alone explain the increase in the U.S. interest rate and the capital
inflow.
62. Economic Report of the President, 1986, p. 284.
63. U.S. Department of Qn'nerce, British Central Statistical Office, West
German hrndesbank, and Japanese Economic Planning Agency.
64. thanges in private or public saving also tend to affect the level of
income, when the economy is operating at less than full employment. lb
focus on the relationship among saving, investment, and overseas bor-
rowing as percentages of aggregate income, it helps to think of monetary
policy in the background holding income constant. It is, in fact, not
unrealistic to think of the Federal Reserve as having targeted nominal
GNP in recent years.
65. Economic Report of the President, 1986, p. 371.
66. The 1982—84 figures were revised in 1985 to incorporate the results of a
1982 benchmark survey of U.S. direct investment abroad. On the revised
figures, the United States passed into net debtor status in January 1985.—64—
67.The uncertainties are particularly large vis—a—vis Latin America. Much
capital flight to the United States is unreported. Furthermore, one
mightnotwish to count the loans of U.S. banks to troubled debtors at
fullvalue as they now appear on the books. A 50 percent write—down, for
example, would wipe out over $100 billion of claims on Latin America
alone.
68. Federal Reserve Balletin, May 1986, p. 294. A separate point is that a
precise definition of the term "net debtor" would include only loans and
bonds, excluding corporate stock and direct invesment. See Van der Ven
and Wilson (1986, p. 11). However, investment income has to be paid to
foreign residents not just in the form of interest on the debt, but
equally in the form of dividends and repatriated earnings on the rest.
69. Economic Indicators, October 1986.
70. From the viewpoint of other countries, the favorable aspect of the
capital flow is their trade surpluses vis—a—vis the United States, and
the unfavorable aspect is that their real interest rates are higher than
they would otherwise be •Ththpoints are particularly relevant for
troubled debtors who must compete with the United States for funds.—65—
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